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THE SHIFTING FOCUS OF FEDERAL
INTERVENTION IN RETIREE
HEALTH BENEFITS
Susan E. Cancelosi*
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Postal Service (USPS) has teetered on the brink of dis-
aster each fall in recent years. The reasons are manifold, but the tipping point
seems to rest improbably on a retirement benefit. Back in 2006, Congress
decided the USPS should fund its accumulated future retiree health liability
over a ten-year period.1 That translates to more than $5 billion due each Sep-
tember,2 which the struggling national mail service institution can ill afford to
pay.3 The USPS problem is extreme and aggravated by unique legislation, but
similar issues haunt most employment-based retiree health plans. With millions
of current and future retirees and their families depending on such benefits, the
federal government has intervened sporadically in this area over the past few
decades. While the underlying goal would seem to be preserving these plans as
long as possible, the government’s focus over time has shifted from participants
to employers. This Article follows the path of that shifting focus from the mid-
1980s through today.
Employment-based health plans for retirees and their dependents cover at
least fifteen million individuals in the United States.4 Retiree health insurance
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Law Center. An early version of this Article was presented at a conference on “Employee
Benefits in an Age of Retrenchment,” generously hosted by Washington University School
of Law in St. Louis in March 2012. I am grateful for all the comments received from
participants at that conference. I would also like to thank my colleagues at Wayne Law for
their suggestions, including in particular those from Professors Lance Gable, Peter Hammer,
and Jonathan Weinberg. Certain of the material contained herein is discussed in summary
form in an essay entitled “The Quandary of Federal Intervention in Retiree Health Benefits,”
which builds upon this Article’s ideas. See Susan E. Cancelosi, The Quandry of Federal
Intervention in Retiree Health Benefits, 28 A.B.A. J. Lab. & Emp., Fall 2012, at 15.
1 Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act (Postal Act or PAEA), 5 U.S.C. § 8909a
(2012).
2 Id.; see also JOSEPH CORBETT, U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, REP. NO. ESS-MA-09-001(R),
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT ADVISORY BOARD—ESTIMATES OF POSTAL SERVICE LIABILITY
FOR RETIREE HEALTH BENEFITS 4 (2009), available at http://www.uspsoig.gov/foia_files/
ESS-MA-09-001R.pdf.
3 CORBETT, supra note 2, at 5.
4 Estimates vary. In 2007, one report calculated the number of retirees and dependents cov-
ered under an employer plan for early retirees at 6.5 million. Mark Merlis, Health Policy
Brief: Early Retiree Insurance, HEALTH AFF., Nov. 23, 2010, at 1, available at http://health
affairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/healthpolicybrief_32.pdf. An Employee Benefit
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includes plans for both early retirees and Medicare-eligible retirees.5 Plans for
early retirees—in general, those at least age fifty-five but not yet sixty-five6—
typically provide primary health insurance, often simply a continuation of
active employee coverage; plans for Medicare-eligible retirees are secondary to
Medicare and provide wrap-around coverage.7 For both groups, employment-
Research Institute (EBRI) analysis of early retirees and dependents with employment-based
coverage, using 2004 and 2007 data, predicted 1.3 million covered individuals in 2010. Paul
Fronstin, The Early Retiree Reinsurance Program: $5 Billion Will Last About Two Years, 31
EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. NOTES, July 2010, at 2, 5–6, available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/
notespdf/EBRI_Notes_07-July10.Reins-Early.pdf. The U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) estimated that more than 4.5 million individuals in employment-
based early retiree health plans were helped in 2010 and early 2011 by subsidies through the
Early Retiree Reinsurance Program created by health reform. HHS, PROGRESS REPORT ON
THE EARLY RETIREE REINSURANCE PROGRAM (2011), available at http://cciio.cms.gov/
resources/files/errp_progress_report_3_31_11.pdf. On the Medicare side, thirty-four percent
of the 40.8 million Medicare beneficiaries in 2007—or slightly less than 13.9 million indi-
viduals—enjoyed supplemental insurance through an employer. JULIETTE CUBANSKI ET AL.,
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., EXAMINING SOURCES OF SUPPLEMENTAL INSURANCE AND PRESCRIP-
TION DRUG COVERAGE AMONG MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES: FINDINGS FROM THE MEDICARE
CURRENT BENEFICIARY SURVEY, 2007, at 4 (2009), available at http://www.kff.org/medi-
care/upload/7801-02.pdf/ (detailing sources of Medicare supplemental insurance); see also
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (CMS), DATA COMPENDIUM TABLE IV.1: MEDI-
CARE ENROLLEES SELECTED YEARS (2008), https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-
and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/DataCompendium/16_2008DataCompendium.
html (listing numbers of Medicare enrollees by year). The percentage of Medicare benefi-
ciaries with retiree health benefits remained almost constant in 2008. About thirty-three per-
cent of Medicare recipients had supplemental coverage from a former employer in that year.
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KAISER FAST FACTS: SUPPLEMENTAL COVERAGE AMONG MEDI-
CARE BENEFICIARIES, BY INCOME, 2008 (Jan. 18, 2011), http://facts.kff.org/chart.aspx?ch=
1931.
5 If an employer provides retiree health benefits at all, overwhelmingly those retiree health
benefits include coverage for early retirees. In 2010, of public and private employers that had
200 or more employees and that offered any form of retiree health plan, ninety-three percent
offered retiree health benefits to early retirees, and seventy-five percent offered benefits to
Medicare-eligible retirees. Gary Claxton et al., Kaiser Family Found. & Health Research &
Educ. Trust (HRET), Employer Health Benefits, 2010 ANNUAL SURVEY 1, 166, available at
http://ehbs.kff.org/pdf/2010/8085.pdf [hereinafter Kaiser Family Found. & HRET, 2010
ANNUAL SURVEY].
6 Eligibility for retiree health insurance depends on the terms of a particular employer’s
plan, but usually requires attainment of at least age fifty-five with some number of years of
service. A 2002 study of retiree health plans sponsored by large employers determined that
the most common service requirements were six to ten years and the next most common
were eleven to fifteen years. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEWITT ASSOC., THE CURRENT
STATE OF RETIREE HEALTH BENEFITS: FINDINGS FROM THE KAISER/HEWITT 2002 RETIREE
HEALTH SURVEY vi (2002), available at http://www.kff.org/medicare/loader.cfm?url=/com-
monspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=14031. The federal Early Retiree Reinsurance Pro-
gram (ERRP) created by health reform to support existing employment-based early retiree
health plans provides reimbursement for expenses incurred by retirees age fifty-five to sixty-
five who are not Medicare-eligible. HHS, The Affordable Care Act’s Early Retiree Reinsur-
ance Program, HEALTHCARE.GOV (Oct. 4, 2010), http://www.healthcare.gov/news/fact
sheets/2010/10/early-retiree-reinsurance-program.html.
7 See, e.g., Greta E. Cowart, Benefits in a Challenging Economy—The Legacy Cost of
Retiree Medical Benefits, in RETIREMENT, DEFERRED COMPENSATION, AND WELFARE PLANS
OF TAX-EXEMPT AND GOVERNMENTAL EMPLOYERS 147, § II.A (2009) (ALI-ABA CLE
course materials—SR014).
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based coverage is important.8 For early retirees, it is critical because they typi-
cally have few, if any, alternatives to employer-sponsored plans.9 In fact, indi-
viduals with a choice rarely retire before Medicare eligibility unless they
qualify for retiree health benefits.10 For Medicare-eligible retirees, the supple-
mental insurance available through employers often is both less expensive and
more comprehensive than what private Medicare supplemental policies (often
referred to as “Medigap” plans11) offer. When an employer reduces or termi-
nates that supplemental coverage, the costs shift to retirees, who may not have
the resources to adapt easily to new financial demands.
Notwithstanding the importance of these benefits, larger employers—gen-
erally, the ones that provide retiree health insurance12—have been dropping all
types of retiree medical insurance steadily since the late 1980s.13 A fundamen-
tal principle of the United States employee benefits system is that employers
are free to choose to provide benefits or not.14 Only after an employer volunta-
rily establishes an employee benefit plan does government regulation begin,
and employers remain generally free to amend or terminate health benefit
plans, including those for retirees, at any time for any reason.15 Collectively
bargained plans are the primary exception, but even then employers have found
ways to escape from retiree health commitments when they so desire.16 By the
fall of 2011, only twenty-six percent of surveyed employers with two hundred
or more employees provided any form of retiree health benefits, a stunning
decline from the sixty-six percent who offered such benefits in 1988.17
In light of the importance of retiree health insurance to covered individu-
als, the federal government has intervened on occasion, first in the 1980s and
8 See infra Part II.
9 See infra notes 27–37 and accompanying text.
10 See Courtney Monk & Alicia H. Munnell, The Implications of Declining Retiree Health
Insurance 4 (Ctr. for Ret. Research at Bos. Coll., Working Paper No. 2009-15, 2009), avail-
able at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/wp_2009-15-508.pdf (noting that
“retiree health insurance increases the probability of retirement by 30 percent to 80 percent”
and citing a wide array of literature on the subject). See also Sandra Block, Early Retirees
Try to Fill Gap in Health Coverage, USA TODAY, Jan. 15, 2008, at 1B; Chris Farrell, Early
Retirement and Health Insurance, MARKETPLACE (May 8, 2008, 1:27 AM), http://www.mar-
ketplace.org/topics/your-money/getting-personal/early-retirement-and-health-insurance
(observing “that the deal-breaker to early retirement is usually health insurance”).
11 See, e.g., CMS & NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, 2012 CHOOSING A MEDIGAP POLICY: A
GUIDE TO HEALTH INSURANCE FOR PEOPLE WITH MEDICARE 9, 12–13, 18 (2012), available
at http://www.medicare.gov/Pubs/pdf/02110.pdf.
12 In 2010, twenty-eight percent of employers with 200 or more employees offered some
form of retiree health insurance as compared with only three percent of smaller employers.
Kaiser Family Found. & HRET, 2010 ANNUAL SURVEY, supra note 5, at 164.
13 In 1988, sixty-six percent of large employers offered retiree health benefits as compared
to only twenty-six percent in 2010. Gary Claxton et al., Kaiser Family Found. & HRET,
Employer Health Benefits, 2011 ANNUAL SURVEY 1, 161, available at http://ehbs.kff.org/
pdf/2011/8225.pdf [hereinafter Kaiser Family Found. & HRET, 2011 ANNUAL SURVEY].
14 See, e.g., Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 78 (1995) (“ERISA does
not create any substantive entitlement to employer-provided health benefits or any other kind
of welfare benefits.”).
15 Id. (“Employers or other plan sponsors are generally free under ERISA, for any reason at
any time, to adopt, modify, or terminate welfare plans.”).
16 See, e.g., infra note 62 and accompanying text.
17 See Kaiser Family Found. & HRET, 2011 ANNUAL SURVEY, supra note 13, at 161.
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again as recently as 2010’s health reform legislation. At the outset, federal
efforts took a participant-oriented approach. Since then, however, the federal
government’s focus has shifted toward employers, using incentives and accom-
modations as the tools. After setting the stage for why employment-based
retiree health benefits matter and for the challenges facing employers, this Arti-
cle considers federal action from the requirements of the Consolidated Omni-
bus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (better known as COBRA)18 through
the incentive approach of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(PPACA)19 in 2010. In tracing these actions, the Article classifies federal
efforts into three loose categories: participant-oriented protection, mandated
funding, and employer accommodation/incentives.20
II. WHY EMPLOYMENT-BASED RETIREE HEALTH INSURANCE MATTERS
People retire before age sixty-five for a multitude of reasons. Choosing to
terminate active employment may reflect physical limitations21 or simply a
desire to pursue other interests22—whether travel, family time, neglected hob-
bies, or overdue relaxation.23 Whatever the impetus, retirement decisions
depend on assessments of an individual’s financial situation, and access to
affordable health insurance is a cornerstone of a stable retirement existence.
Should retiree insurance terminate,24 its absence upends a basic assumption
18 Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat.
82 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 10, 15, 29, 33, 38, 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter
COBRA]. President Reagan signed COBRA into law on April 7, 1986.
19 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 25, 26, 29, 42 U.S.C.), and the Health Care
and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 20, 26, 42 U.S.C.), together constitute 2010’s major health
reform legislation. For convenience, references herein to “health reform” shall mean either
or both of the Affordable Care Act and the Reconciliation Act, as applicable.
20 There is considerable overlap between these suggested “categories.” See generally infra
Part IV.
21 See, e.g., PATRICIA F. ADAMS ET AL., HHS, SUMMARY HEALTH STATISTICS FOR THE U.S.
POPULATION: NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY, 2009, at 6 (2010), available at http://
www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_10/sr10_248.pdf (finding that “[p]ersons aged 45–64 and
65–69 years were more than three times as likely to be unable to work due to health reasons
as persons aged 18–44 years”). See also Beth Fenner, Work Until We’re 70? You Cannot Be
Serious, CNN MONEY (Sept. 13, 2010, 5:58 PM), http://moremoney.blogs.money.cnn.com/
2010/09/13/work-until-were-70-you-cannot-be-serious/.
22 An AARP survey in 2011 found that working baby boomers were almost evenly divided
between forty-three percent who “can’t wait to retire” and forty-one percent who want to
continue working. AARP & GFK CUSTOM RESEARCH N. AM., BABY BOOMERS ENVISION
WHAT’S NEXT? 4 (2011).
23 For example, AARP found in 2011 that seventy-one percent of baby boomers expected to
spend time with their families in retirement, sixty-six percent expected to spend time with
hobbies and other interests, fifty-seven percent perceived retirement as a “time of leisure,”
forty-nine percent hoped to travel, and forty-five percent planned to “indulge themselves.”
Id. at 5.
24 Although terminations are the worst scenario, an employer may modify a retiree plan to
shift increasing amounts of cost to retirees. Depending on the level of cost shifting, a retiree
on a fixed income may eventually be unable to afford the premium and other expenses. For a
retiree, such an outcome may be comparable in impact to plan termination if the retiree finds
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upon which retirement was predicated.25 Making matters worse, losing retiree
health benefits leaves a void not easily filled. Depending on the reasons for
retirement, an individual may not be willing or able to return to full-time
employment to obtain active employee coverage. Even if someone is both will-
ing and able, an older person’s chances of returning to a comparable position
are limited.26 Employment-based coverage, once lost, may well be gone
forever.
Without employer-provided insurance, early retirees find themselves in a
particularly difficult position. Adults who are neither age sixty-five nor dis-
abled currently do not enjoy good alternatives to employer-provided health
benefits.27 Group health insurance through one’s work does not discriminate on
himself or herself unable to sustain employment-based coverage. See, e.g., SOC. SEC. ADVI-
SORY BD., THE UNSUSTAINABLE COST OF HEALTH CARE 1, 7 (2009), available at http://
www.ssab.gov/documents/TheUnsustainableCostofHealthCare_graphics.pdf (highlighting
the impact on retirees and others of rising health care costs).
25 Admittedly, retirees’ assumptions about their healthcare expenses in retirement may well
be inaccurate. See, e.g., Sun Life Fin., Flying Blind: How Working Americans View Health-
care Costs in Retirement, SUN LIFE FIN. UNRETIREMENT SURV., at 3 (May 4, 2011), http://
cdn.sunlife.com/static/unitedstates/Announcements/Press%20releases/2011/Sun%20Life%
20Financial%20-%20Flying%20Blind%20Survey%20Results%2005042011.pdf (reporting
that ninety-two percent of surveyed employees “either have no idea what their healthcare
costs will be in retirement, or vastly underestimate those costs” and that seventy-four percent
“lack specific plans to cover retirement healthcare costs”).
26 AARP reports that “since the start of the recession, both the number of unemployed and
the unemployment rate have increased by a greater percentage for the segment of the
workforce aged 55 and over than for younger segments.” Sara E. Rix, The Employment
Situation, November 2010: Little Holiday Cheer in the News, FACT SHEET NO. 208 (AARP
Pub. Policy Inst.), Dec. 2010, at 1, available at http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/ppi/econ-sec/
fs208-employment.pdf. Moreover, individuals age fifty-five and older tend to be out of work
for long periods even if seeking employment. Nearly sixty percent of those age fifty-five and
older who were seeking work had been out of work for at least twenty-seven weeks as of
November 2010. Id. at 6.
27 See, e.g., MARILYN MOON, TIAA-CREF INST., TRENDS AND ISSUES: EARLY RETIREE
HEALTH INSURANCE ISSUES 8–10 (2007), available at http://www1.tiaa-cref.org/ucm/groups/
content/@ap_ucm_p_tcp_docs/documents/document/tiaa02029494.pdf (highlighting alterna-
tives for individual insurance for older individuals and noting the expense of such options).
Some early retirees may qualify for coverage under a state high-risk health insurance pool. A
total of thirty-five states maintain high-risk insurance pools for individuals who are consid-
ered otherwise uninsurable, but the pools are limited. See States That Have Risk Pools,
NAT’L ASS’N OF ST. COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH INS. PLANS (NASCHIP), http://www.naschip.
org/states_pools.htm (last visited May 8, 2013); Member Eligibility, NASCHIP, http://nas-
chip.org/portal/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=100&Itemid=279 (last
visited May 8, 2013) (summarizing the eligibility rules used by different state high-risk
pools); Impact on Uninsured Rates, NASCHIP, http://naschip.org/portal/index.php?option=
com_content&view=article&id=106&Itemid=284 (last visited May 8, 2013) (noting that
“high-risk pool coverage is available only to a small subset of the uninsured population
because it is targeted for uninsured people who have serious health conditions and ail-
ments”). In 2008, a total of only 200,991 individuals were enrolled in coverage through state
high-risk pools. Member Eligibility, supra. To improve the situation, the Affordable Care
Act funded a new federal high-risk program—the Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Plan
(PCIP)—intended to bridge certain uninsured individuals to 2014. 42 U.S.C. § 18001(a)
(2012). See also Nancy-Ann DeParle, Insurance for Americans with Pre-Existing Condi-
tions, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (July 29, 2010, 8:40 AM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/
2010/07/29/insurance-americans-with-pre-existing-conditions; Press Release, HHS, HHS
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the basis of health status; all similarly situated employees are similarly eligible
for coverage.28 The same applies to retiree health plans sponsored by an
employer. Eligibility for coverage under such plans depends on retiree status,
not health conditions. Individual insurance, on the other hand, historically has
come with no such protections, and insurers have routinely denied applications
by those whom the companies perceive as poor risks.29 Because health declines
with age,30 those old enough to qualify for retirement—early or normal—often
fall into the poor risk category.31
Even if an early retiree can find an insurer willing to issue individual cov-
erage, the cost may outstrip what the individual can afford. For example, in
2010, the average per person monthly health insurance premium was $215 for
individual coverage32 as compared to an average monthly premium contribu-
Secretary Sebelius Announces New Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Plan (July 1, 2010),
available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2010pres/07/20100701a.html (characterizing
the PCIP as a “transitional program until 2014”). To qualify for the federal program, a per-
son must have a pre-existing condition and not have had “creditable” coverage for at least
six months. 42 U.S.C. § 18001(d). Because the eligibility requirements are less strict, some
early retirees who could not qualify for a state’s high-risk pool in prior years may be able to
obtain coverage through the PCIP. On the other hand, many early retirees will either still not
fit into an eligibility category or be unable to afford the premium cost.
28 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)–(b) (2012).
29 Individual insurance has historically been regulated at the state level as a result of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–15 (2012). Although some states have created
high-risk pools to provide insurance for individuals with health conditions, private insurers
have still been allowed to refuse to issue policies to individuals they perceive as compara-
tively higher risk. See MOON, supra note 27, at 8. Health reform, however, is supplanting
much state regulation with new federal requirements that remove much of the freedom to
deny coverage previously granted to insurers. See Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Rhetorical
Federalism: The Value of State-Based Dissent to Federal Health Reform, 39 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 111, 150 (2010). The Affordable Care Act and Reconciliation Act generally provide
that every “health insurance issuer that offers health insurance coverage in the individual or
group market in a State must accept every employer and individual in the State that applies
for such coverage.” 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1(a) (2012). This inherently eliminates insurers’ abil-
ity to reject individual health insurance applicants on the basis of health or age.
30 Results from the National Health Interview Survey, 2004–2007, revealed that 19.6% of
those aged fifty-five to sixty-four reported themselves in fair or poor health as did 32.1% of
those aged eighty-five and older. CHARLOTTE A. SCHOENBORN & KATHLEEN M. HEYMAN,
HHS, HEALTH CHARACTERISTICS OF ADULTS AGED 55 YEARS AND OVER: UNITED STATES,
2004–2007, at 3 (2009), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsr016.pdf. In the
2009 National Health Interview Survey, 37.9% of those aged eighteen to forty-four reported
themselves in excellent health, and 32.8% reported themselves in very good health. ADAMS
ET AL., supra note 21, at 12. By contrast, only 17% aged sixty-five to seventy-four reported
themselves in excellent health; 29.8% reported themselves in very good health. Id.
31 A 2008 review determined that individuals ages sixty to sixty-four were more than twice
as likely to be denied individual insurance coverage than individuals ages thirty-five to
thirty-nine. GRETCHEN JACOBSON, KARYN SCHWARTZ & TRICIA NEUMAN, KAISER FAMILY
FOUND., HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR OLDER ADULTS: IMPLICATIONS OF A MEDICARE
BUY-IN 5 (2009), available at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/7904-02.pdf. Moreo-
ver, even when an insurer issued an individual policy to someone in the fifty-five to sixty-
four age range, about ten percent of individual policies denied coverage for pre-existing
conditions. Id.
32 Kaiser Family Found., Average Per Person Monthly Premiums in the Individual Market,
2010, STATEHEALTHFACTS.ORG, http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparemaptable.jsp?ind=
976&cat=5 (last visited May 8, 2013). The preceding per-person premium calculated by
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tion of $75 by an employee for single coverage through an employer.33 One
analysis concluded that paying just the individual insurance premium for some-
one age fifty-five to sixty-four would eliminate twenty-four percent of the
median pre-tax family income in 2008; paying the family premium outside the
group insurance market would take forty percent of that income.34 Individuals
can pay out-of-pocket for health care, of course, but few retirees have sufficient
resources.35
The only remaining alternative is government-provided or government-
paid care, such as that available through Medicare and Medicaid for certain
parts of the population. But healthy, early retirees historically have not quali-
fied for either of the safety net programs. Except for those with serious disabili-
ties or certain terminal conditions, Medicare eligibility begins at age sixty-
five.36 Medicaid eligibility traditionally has required not only that a person fit
into specified categories—none of which has been likely for someone age fifty-
five-plus who is not disabled—but also that the person be impoverished.37
On the other hand, retirees age sixty-five and older start out reasonably
well thanks to Medicare’s safety net.38 They still need and use employment-
Kaiser is based on all individual premiums, without regard to age. Individual premiums for
older persons are much higher. In 2009, the average annual premium for someone age fifty-
five to sixty-four was $5,349 as compared to an average annual premium of only $1,429 for
someone age eighteen to twenty-four. JACOBSON, SCHWARTZ & NEUMAN, supra note 31, at
5.
33 Kaiser Family Found. & HRET, 2010 ANNUAL SURVEY, supra note 5, at 73.
34 JACOBSON, SCHWARTZ & NEUMAN, supra note 31, at 5.
35 The median U.S. net worth for households headed by someone age sixty-five to seventy-
four in 2007 was only $239,400. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2012 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT: THE
NATIONAL DATA BOOK, at tbl.721 (2012), http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/cats/
income_expenditures_poverty_wealth.html. Fidelity Investments estimated that a couple
retiring in 2012 would need $240,000 to pay medical expenses in retirement, not including
long-term care costs (such as nursing home care). Retirees Face Estimated $240,000 in Med-
ical Costs, FIDELITY (May 16, 2012), http://www.fidelity.com/viewpoints/retirees-medical-
expenses. Once individuals reach age sixty-five and Medicare eligibility, the financial situa-
tion hardly improves. For example, in 2008, almost one in six individuals age sixty-five or
older had income below 125% of the federal poverty level ($10,326 for an individual).
ELLEN O’BRIEN ET AL., AARP PUB. POLICY INST., OLDER AMERICANS IN POVERTY: A SNAP-
SHOT 1 (2010), available at http://www.aarp.org/work/retirement-planning/info-04-2010/20
10-03-poverty-new.html.
36 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (2012).
37 See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICAID: A PRIMER 7 (2010), available at http://www.kff.
org/medicaid/7334.cfm. Medicaid eligibility expansion is a key component of health reform.
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., EXPLAINING HEALTH CARE REFORM: QUESTIONS ABOUT MEDI-
CAID’S ROLE 1 (2010), available at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/7920-02.pdf.
See generally CTR. FOR HEALTH CARE STRATEGIES, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., MEDI-
CAID STATE PLAN AMENDMENT REQUIREMENTS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (2012),
available at http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/issue_briefs/2012/rwjf401586
(listing implementation dates of changes to Medicaid policies and eligibility requirements).
38 For some older individuals, although they are eligible for Medicare coverage, Medicare
acts as secondary—or supplemental—insurance to an employer plan as a result of the Medi-
care Secondary Payer (MSP) rules. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b) (2012) (providing that an employer
plan may not consider Medicare eligibility and benefits in determining plan benefits for
someone whose employer plan coverage results from current employment). For more discus-
sion of the MSP rules, see HINDA CHAIKIND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MEDICARE SECON-
DARY PAYER—COORDINATION OF BENEFITS 2 (2008), available at http://aging.senate.gov/
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based coverage, however, because gaps in Medicare coverage make the safety
net far less solid than many realize.39 Thus, for example, annual out-of-pocket
health care spending by Medicare beneficiaries averaged $4,241 per beneficiary
in 2006, with younger beneficiaries spending far less on average than older
ones.40 The vast majority of Medicare beneficiaries—eighty-nine percent in
2007—therefore obtain some form of secondary insurance to offset these
costs.41 About a third have access to such insurance through a former
employer.42 This remained true even after the Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement, and Modernization Act (MMA)43 added Part D prescription drug
coverage,44 closing what had been one of the most glaring benefit holes.
III. THE CHALLENGE OF EMPLOYMENT-BASED RETIREE HEALTH INSURANCE
Employers offer benefits to their employees for a variety of reasons,45 but
any employer will seek to balance the cost of a particular benefit with a corre-
crs/medicare11.pdf. Individuals who remain actively employed are by definition not retired
and thus fall largely outside the scope of this Article’s concerns. See also infra notes 69–75
and accompanying text.
39 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a) (2012) (detailing items and services excluded from Medicare). At a
minimum, a beneficiary electing traditional Medicare Parts A (hospital insurance) and B
(supplemental insurance), plus Part D drug coverage, must pay the Part A deductible ($1,184
in 2013) for each spell of illness during a year, plus co-insurance (beginning at $296 per day
for hospitalization after the first 60 days in a spell of illness). In addition, that beneficiary
must pay a monthly Part B premium (for most people, $104.90 per month in 2013, but
adjusted upward for higher income beneficiaries), plus at least twenty percent Part B co-
insurance every time the beneficiary accesses Part B services. The beneficiary must also pay
a Part D premium and co-pays for drugs, all set by the private drug plan insurer that provides
the Part D plan the beneficiary elects. Very low-income individuals may qualify for financial
assistance with all these costs. CMS, MEDICARE & YOU 25, 30, 95–96 (2013), available at
http://www.medicare.gov/Publications/Pubs/pdf/10050.pdf.
40 KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KAISER FAST FACTS: AVERAGE PER CAPITA OUT-OF-POCKET
SPENDING BY MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES, BY AGE AND HEALTH STATUS, 2006 (2010), availa-
ble at http://facts.kff.org/chart.aspx?cb=58&sctn=168&ch=1787 (indicating that out-of-
pocket spending averaged $3,500 per year for beneficiaries age sixty-five to seventy-four,
but $7,487 per year for beneficiaries age eighty-five or older).
41 CUBANSKI ET AL., supra note 4, at 4.
42 In 2007, 34% obtained supplemental coverage through an employer plan, 22% elected a
Medicare Advantage plan, 17% purchased Medigap coverage, and 15% were covered for
out-of-pocket expenses through Medicaid. Id. Only 11% did not have supplemental cover-
age. Id. Of course, some number of those age sixty-five and older continue to work in jobs
with health coverage (or are covered by health insurance through a spouse who remains in
the workforce). In 2010, for example, 16.2% of the population age sixty-five or older
remained employed. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 35, at tbl.34.
43 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No.
108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified in scattered sections of 26, 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter MMA].
44 Id. § 109.
45 The unique development of the U.S. employment-based health insurance system has been
thoroughly discussed. See, e.g., COLIN GORDON, DEAD ON ARRIVAL: THE POLITICS OF
HEALTH CARE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 12–46 (2003); INST. OF MED., EMPLOY-
MENT AND HEALTH BENEFITS: A CONNECTION AT RISK 49–86 (Marilyn J. Field & Harold T.
Shapiro eds., 1993). See also Jon R. Gabel, Job-Based Health Insurance, 1977–1998: The
Accidental System Under Scrutiny, 18 HEALTH AFF. 62, 65 (1999).
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sponding value to the employer.46 This fundamental point remains key to
understanding employers’ choices. Including health insurance in a benefits
package may attract and retain qualified workers. Depending on the industry,
employer-provided health insurance may be so commonplace as to put any
employer that does not provide coverage at a competitive disadvantage. Once
someone is hired, access to affordable health insurance helps ensure that
employee’s continuing ability to perform his or her job functions. Further,
beginning in 2014, employers will be subject to tax penalties should they fail to
provide a specified level of affordable health insurance to active workers.47
Taken together, these factors coalesce into a fairly strong incentive for employ-
ers to continue active employee insurance.
Similar incentives historically applied to retiree health insurance. When
most large employers offered retiree health benefits,48 to do otherwise could
have impeded hiring and retention efforts. Qualifying for coverage could give
valuable long-term employees a powerful reason to stay with a particular
employer. Conversely, the availability of retiree coverage might encourage an
older worker to leave voluntarily49 and avoid potential problems with the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 196750 (ADEA).
Once an individual retires, however, employer incentives fade. While the
availability of retiree health benefits may have attracted an individual to the
46 See, e.g., EBRI, DO EMPLOYERS/EMPLOYEES STILL NEED EMPLOYEE BENEFITS? 2 (Dallas
L. Salisbury ed., 1998), available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/books/need_emp_
benefits.pdf (quoting Michael Losey, then-president of the Society for Human Resource
Management, as saying: “Benefits are a big cost of doing business, and as a big cost, the
shareholders and the CEOs are going to say, ‘What am I getting for my money, what’s the
return on my investment?’ ”). In 1967, one benefits consultant characterized the situation as
follows: “Employee benefits have been viewed as a motivational tool, as protection for an
employee’s standard of living, as a bargaining device in union negotiations, as a way of
meeting competition in an ever tightening labor market, and even as a necessary evil.”
George C. Foust, Jr., The Total Approach Concept, in THE TOTAL APPROACH TO EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS 9, 9 (Arthur J. Deric ed., 1967). See also ROBERT D. GRAY, CAL. INST. OF TECH.,
APPRAISING AND INTEGRATING EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 17 (1956) (“Although benefit plans are
often referred to as employee benefits, it is necessary that the employer also benefit.”).
47 I.R.C. § 4980H (2012).
48 See supra note 13.
49 For employers in shrinking industries or in worsening economies, early retirement incen-
tives offer a relatively painless way to reduce workforces without involuntary terminations.
Often, older workers cost more in wages, which means that their termination reduces payroll
expenses more than laying off a less expensive younger worker. Even when an employer’s
goal does not include reducing the size of a workforce, that employer may still want to ease
older workers out to give younger employers room to grow. For example, writing in the mid-
1960s, a vice president with Towers, Perrin, Forster, and Crosby, Inc. included “replacement
of the superannuated” and facilitation of “early retirement” as key objectives of an
employer’s pension program. Foust, Jr., supra note 46, at 16. Mr. Foust also noted a move-
ment toward earlier retirement, observing that with “automation as an impetus, the trend to
earlier retirement is becoming more pronounced.” Id. at 17. Similarly, more than four
decades later, consulting firm Towers Watson noted that “[r]etiree medical programs can add
an important component to a company’s reward portfolio, and provide valuable support for
retirement readiness and an organization’s related workforce management goals.” TOWERS
WATSON, 2010 HEALTH CARE COST SURVEY 8 (2010).
50 Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codi-
fied as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634) [hereinafter ADEA].
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employer at the outset of employment, that employer has already reaped the
reward by attracting and retaining the individual during his or her employment
period. An employer no longer cares whether a retiree can perform job func-
tions because the individual is by definition no longer part of that employer’s
workforce. And the PPACA’s coverage penalties do not apply to retiree health
plans.51 The worst the employer faces by terminating or reducing the value of
retiree health benefits is the possibility of a lawsuit, which the employer is
likely to win.52
Meanwhile, the cost of retiree health benefits weights the scale against
their maintenance. One study concluded that the cost of providing employment-
based health benefits to retirees in 2010 would increase six percent for pre-
sixty-five retirees and four percent for Medicare-eligible retirees, matching
prior years’ increases.53 That translates to a per-person cost of $7,596 per early
retiree and $3,840 for the Medicare-eligible retiree, as compared to $5,184 per
active employee for single coverage.54 Even though employers have largely
dealt with this problem by shifting costs to retirees,55 10% of large employers
51 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 4980H (imposing penalties on employers who fail to satisfy certain
health insurance requirements, but only with regard to “full-time employees” and not
retirees).
52 See, e.g., Richard L. Kaplan, Nicholas J. Powers & Jordan Zucker, Retirees at Risk: The
Precarious Promise of Post-Employment Health Benefits, 9 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. &
ETHICS 287, 305 (2009). Arguably, an employer might also attract unwelcome negative pub-
licity. See, e.g., David Shepardson, Supplier Retirees to Get Fed Health Care Help, DETROIT
NEWS, Oct. 20, 2011, at 1A.
53 Press Release, Towers Watson, Towers Perrin’s 2010 Retiree Health Care Cost Survey
Shows Continuing Affordability and Access Concerns (Nov. 18, 2009), available at http://
www.towersperrin.com/tp/showdctmdoc.jsp?url=master_Brand_2/USA/Press_Releases/20
09/20091118/2009_11_18.htm.
54 Id. The significantly lower per-person cost for Medicare-eligible retirees reflects the fact
that retiree health plans for such individuals provide only supplemental coverage to Medi-
care, with the federal program picking up the bulk of the expenses. See, e.g., supra note 7
and accompanying text.
55 Retirees today pay much of the cost of their coverage. Only forty-five percent of employ-
ers offering retiree health insurance in 2010 still subsidized that coverage for current retirees.
Towers Watson, supra note 53. The remainder offered access-only insurance. An access-
only plan guarantees a retiree the ability to purchase health coverage at group insurance
rates, but the covered individual shoulders the entire premium cost. Such plans are far less
generous to retirees than active employee coverage because employers usually subsidize
much of the premium cost for their workers. In 2010, in large firms that provided health
insurance to active employees, the average annual premium cost paid by a worker for single
coverage was only $917, but employers paid an average of $4,133 as their share of the
premium for that worker’s insurance. Kaiser Family Found. & HRET, 2010 ANNUAL SUR-
VEY, supra note 5, at 80. In 2006, 17% of large employers offering retiree health benefits
charged new early retirees 100% of the premium cost of the coverage. KAISER FAMILY
FOUND. & HEWITT ASSOCS., RETIREE HEALTH BENEFITS EXAMINED: FINDINGS FROM THE
KAISER/HEWITT 2006 SURVEY ON RETIREE HEALTH BENEFITS 16 (2006), available at http://
www.kff.org/medicare/upload/7587.pdf [hereinafter RETIREE HEALTH BENEFITS EXAMINED] .
Among employers who still pay something, most keep their subsidy relatively low. For
example, in 2010 pre-sixty-five retirees paid on average $3,984 for single coverage, more
than half the premium cost. Towers Watson, supra note 53. In addition, employers have
moved other costs to retirees through increased deductibles and co-insurance. For example,
in 2006, 34% of large employers reported that they had increased cost-sharing requirements
for early retirees, and 24% had done so for Medicare-eligible beneficiaries. RETIREE HEALTH
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surveyed in 2006 predicted that they were “very” or “somewhat” likely to ter-
minate coverage altogether for future retirees, with another 2% predicting that
they were “very” or “somewhat” likely to terminate coverage for current retir-
ees.56 A 2010 survey similarly found that ten percent of companies with
existing retiree health plans were “planning to exit, and 20% are seriously con-
sidering this option for the future.”57 An early 2011 study reported that almost
60% of surveyed large employers currently offering retiree plans were “rethink-
ing” their programs for 2012 or 2013.58
IV. FEDERAL INTERVENTION OVER THE YEARS
To the extent one believes the federal government should take some
responsibility for protecting vulnerable segments of the population, the need for
federal intervention to preserve retiree health plans might seem clear in light of
the foregoing. That has not always been true. While the enactment of Medicare
in 1965 demonstrated the political efficacy of targeting health insurance reform
proposals to the elderly,59 the experience did not translate into sustained Con-
gressional attention to the issue. The Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA) when enacted paid only cursory attention to welfare plans
in general, focusing instead on protecting retirement income benefits.60 None
of ERISA’s participation, vesting, and funding rules, nor the insurance pro-
vided by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, extended to welfare
plans.61 ERISA instead left retirees on their own to craft arguments in the fed-
BENEFITS EXAMINED, supra at 20–21. Looking forward, 80% of surveyed large employers in
2006 said they were very or somewhat likely to increase retiree premium costs, 40% said
they were very or somewhat likely to increase other retiree cost-sharing obligations, and
30% were very or somewhat likely to increase out-of-pocket cost limits. Id. at 22. Further,
all cost-shifting will increase over time because many companies have imposed caps on the
total amount they will contribute toward retiree health insurance. In 2006, 46% of large
employers reported that they had placed a cap on expenditures for their early retiree plans,
and 50% had done the same for their plans for Medicare-eligible retirees. Id. at 13–14. That
same year, 60% of large employers also reported that they had already reached the cap for
the early retiree plan, and 61% had reached the cap for the Medicare-eligible retiree plan. Id.
Once expenditures reach the cap amount, all future costs automatically pour over to covered
plan participants (i.e., retirees).
56 Id. at 22.
57 Towers Watson, supra note 53.
58 TOWERS WATSON & INT’L SOC’Y OF CERTIFIED EMP. BENEFIT SPECIALISTS, REDEFINING
RETIREE MEDICAL STRATEGY 5 (2011), available at http://www.towerswatson.com/assets/
pdf/4634/Towers-Watson-ICEBS-2011.pdf. With regard to early retiree plans specifically,
forty-three percent of responding employers planned to revisit their approach in the next
three years, with only twenty-five percent anticipating that they will maintain the status quo.
Id. at 7–8. Towers Watson concluded that, out of surveyed employers with early retiree
health plans, “nearly 42% will consider terminating plan sponsorship and encourage pre-
Medicare retirees to elect more favorable coverage in the insurance exchanges.’ ” Id.
59 See, e.g., THEODORE R. MARMOR, THE POLITICS OF MEDICARE 10–12, 15 (2d ed. 2000).
60 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461) [hereinafter ERISA]. See generally JAMES
A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: A POLITICAL
HISTORY (2004).
61 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051 (participation and vesting coverage), 1081 (funding cover-
age), 1302 (Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation coverage) (2012).
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eral courts to try to enforce employer health plan commitments, with limited
success.62 At least some of the explanation lies in the fact that ERISA followed
the shutdown of the Studebaker-Packard Corporation’s South Bend auto manu-
facturing plant and the failure of its pension plan to meet obligations to covered
hourly workers.63 Retiree health benefits barely registered on the collective
federal legislative mind. The late Michael S. Gordon described the situation
thus: “Unlike pension plans there was no crisis in health plans in 1974. No one
was complaining about the loss of health benefits as they were about
pensions.”64
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, to the extent Congress focused on the
health insurance issues of the aged, it concentrated on Medicare’s climbing
costs. Between 1970 and 1975 alone, federal expenditures for Medicare almost
doubled—from approximately $7.1 billion in 1970 to almost $14.8 billion in
1975.65 By 1980, the federal government’s Medicare cost had reached almost
$35 billion66 with predictions that Medicare expenditures could top $61 billion
by fiscal year 1984.67 The early years of the Reagan era thus included a number
of reforms intended to reduce long-term spending in federal social welfare pro-
grams.68 At least one of these reforms—the addition of the Medicare Secon-
dary Payer (MSP) provisions69—directly affected employer plans even though
they were more collateral damage than the intended targets.
The MSP provisions generally prohibit employers that offer health insur-
ance coverage from differentiating between an active employee (and his or her
spouse) who is Medicare-eligible and one who is not.70 In other words, an
employer cannot change an active employee’s health insurance from primary to
supplemental coverage just because that employee becomes eligible for Medi-
care. Without the MSP rules, an employer would have a clear financial incen-
tive to make exactly such a switch and pay for the employee’s health care costs
62 See, e.g., Kaplan, Powers & Zucker, supra note 52, at 305; William T. Payne, Lawsuits
Challenging Termination or Modification of Retiree Welfare Benefits: A Plaintiff’s Perspec-
tive, 10 LAB. LAW. 91, 92 (1994).
63 See generally James A. Wooten, “The Most Glorious Story of Failure in the Business”:
The Studebaker-Packard Corporation and the Origins of ERISA, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 683
(2001).
64 Michael S. Gordon, Introduction to the Second Edition: ERISA in the 21st Century, in
ABA SECTION OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW lxiii, lxviii
(Steven J. Sacher et al. eds., 2d ed. 2000).
65 Alfred M. Skolnik & Sophie R. Dales, Social Welfare Expenditures, 1950–75, 39 SOC.
SECURITY BULL. 3, 7 (1976).
66 Ann Kallman Bixby, Social Welfare Expenditures, Fiscal Year 1980, 46 SOC. SECURITY
BULL. 9, 10 (1983).
67 See U.S. CONG., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, AN ANALYSIS OF PRESIDENT REAGAN’S BUDGET
REVISIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1982, at 41 (1981), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/
default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/101xx/doc10188/81doc11b.pdf.
68 See, e.g., Robert Pear, Hospitals Worry over Fixed Rate Set for Medicare, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 23, 1983, at A1. See also Lynn Etheredge, Reagan, Congress, and Health Spending, 2
HEALTH AFF. 14, 15 (1983).
69 See Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, § 953, 94 Stat. 2599, 2611
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 26, 42 U.S.C.); Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 116, 96 Stat. 324, 353 (codified as
amended in scatted sections of I.R.C.).
70 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(1)(A)(i) (2012).
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only to the extent those costs exceed what Medicare covers. According to the
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), which administers Medi-
care, “[t]he purpose was to shift costs from the Medicare program to private
sources of payment.”71 While this purpose may have been desirable from a
Medicare program perspective, the MSP rules inevitably burdened employers
who could no longer piggyback coverage for the working aged on Medicare.
Whether this affected retiree plans over time is hard to know. At least in the
mid-to-late 1980s, Medicare-eligible retirees with employment-based supple-
mental coverage generally enjoyed an insurance package comparable to that of
active employees.72 In such circumstances, the MSP rules should be irrelevant
to an individual evaluating continued active employment vs. retirement. Look-
ing solely at health insurance costs, an employer logically should prefer an
individual to retire and drop down to employment-based Medicare supplemen-
tal coverage, allowing Medicare to pick up the bulk of health care costs. The
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) would prohibit an
employer’s taking any direct action to push such retirement due to an individ-
ual’s age, however.73 The MSP rules in their infancy therefore should have had
little or no impact on retiree health plans. Today, as employment-based retiree
medical benefits have become less generous and reliable,74 the MSP rules
might prompt a wise individual to push off retirement as long as possible,
potentially reducing the need for retiree plans.75
Whatever the indirect MSP rule effect, direct Congressional intervention
in employment-based retiree health insurance did not begin in earnest until the
mid-1980s, and then only in limited circumstances. This was not necessarily a
matter of negligence or oversight. Although employers had been litigating their
terminations of retiree health benefits for at least a decade,76 the risk to retirees
71 CMS, MEDICARE SECONDARY PAYER (MSP) MANUAL § 10 (2012), available at http://
www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/Manuals/downloads/msp105c01.pdf.
See also Robert L. Roth, The Medicare Secondary Payer Program: New and Continuing
Issues, in HEALTH AND WELFARE BENEFIT PLANS—THE WAVE OF THE FUTURE IS NOW:
WHAT TO DO TODAY AND HOW TO PLAN FOR TOMORROW 1, 1–3 (ABA Center for Continu-
ing Legal Education ed., 1998) (ABA CLE course materials—N98HWBB ABA-LGLED G-
1) (“Congress sought to use the MSP provisions to reduce the growth of Medicare by shift-
ing primary payment responsibility to employer plans ‘to place the burden where it could
best be absorbed.’ ” (citing Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. United States, 740 F.
Supp. 492, 498 (E.D. Tenn. 1990)).
72 See Michael A. Morrisey, Gail A. Jensen & Stephen E. Henderlite, Employer-Sponsored
Health Insurance for Retired Americans, 9 HEALTH AFF. 57, 57, 59 (1990) (discussing how
retirees with employment-based health insurance were instrumental in calling for the suc-
cessful repeal of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-360, and
providing a useful description of the state of retiree health insurance coverage in the 1980s).
73 ADEA, supra note 50.
74 See, e.g., supra notes 53–58 and accompanying text.
75 Cf. Gopi Shah Goda, John B. Shoven & Sita Nataraj Slavov, A Tax on Work for the
Elderly: Medicare as a Secondary Payer 1–2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 13383, 2007), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w13383.pdf (arguing that
the MSP rules in effect created an additional tax for older workers).
76 See, e.g., Frank H. Stewart & Jeffrey B. Kelly, Insurance Premiums for Retirees After the
Union Contract Expires, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 521, 522–23 (1983).
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did not engage the national consciousness until the mid-1980s.77 Indeed, as late
as 1990, one group of scholars evaluating retiree health benefit data from 1988
and earlier years concluded that “it appears that an increasing number of retir-
ees will have employer-sponsored coverage” and moreover that the data “sug-
gests good days ahead for retirees . . . .”78 Time has proved such predictions
wrong,79 but their cautious optimism highlights how quickly retiree health plan
fortunes fell.
Any history of federal efforts to preserve and protect retiree health bene-
fits thus deals with an inherently brief period of time, and this Article focuses
only on understanding the federal actions of the past twenty-five or so years.
Although they could be described chronologically, the various statutory and
administrative efforts are perhaps best evaluated when sorted into a limited
number of categories. The following sections thus loosely group federal inter-
ventions into employer-sponsored retiree health plans into one of three types:
participant-oriented protection, mandatory funding, and employer accommoda-
tion/incentives. As is always the case with any classification system, one might
argue that any particular act fits into more than one group, but the sorting that
follows reflects a perception as to the dominant goal of the particular federal
endeavor. The following sections also attempt to provide some sense as to
whether the federal intervention at issue succeeded in achieving its purpose.
A. Participant-Oriented Protection
In fairness, on a macro level, any federal effort that targets retiree health
benefits could be characterized as protective of participants because all such
efforts directly or indirectly attempt to preserve and protect the availability of
existing plans for retirees. I have classified the actions described in this section
as primarily “participant-oriented” and “protective” because they all seem to
focus on the participant with relatively little consideration of other factors. Per-
haps not surprisingly, most were enacted in the immediate aftermath of retiree
health benefits’ own mini-Studebaker80 crisis: the LTV bankruptcy.
The LTV Corporation filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on July
17, 1986, citing downturns in its core steel and oil businesses.81 At the time,
LTV operated the second-largest steel company in the United States.82 In con-
nection with its Chapter 11 filing, the company unilaterally terminated health
plan benefits for 78,000 of its retirees, triggering a strike and widespread out-
77 See, e.g., Milt Freudenheim, Company Expenses for Retirees Soar, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9,
1985, at A1.
78 Morrisey, Jensen & Henderlite, supra note 72, at 71. The authors cautioned, however,
that both legal and accounting developments on the horizon could alter the rosy future pre-
dicted by their data. Id.
79 See Kaiser Family Found. & HRET, 2010 ANNUAL SURVEY, supra note 5, at 163.
80 For more explanation of the significance of Studebaker in pension plan reform, see supra
note 63 and accompanying text.
81 Michael A. Hiltzik, Debt-Laden LTV Corp. Goes into Bankruptcy: 2nd-Largest U.S. Steel
Firm, Hard Hit by Slumps in that Industry and Oil, Seeks Chapter 11 Help, L.A. TIMES, July
18, 1986, at 1; see also Thomas C. Hayes, LTV Corp. Files for Bankruptcy; Debt Is $4
Billion, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1986, at A1.
82 Hiltzik, supra note 81, at 1.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVJ\13-3\NVJ306.txt unknown Seq: 15 12-JUN-13 14:28
Spring 2013] THE SHIFTING FOCUS 773
cry.83 The U.S. bankruptcy court quickly approved resumption of the bene-
fits,84 but the initial LTV benefit termination shocked Congress into action.85
LTV filed for bankruptcy protection barely three months after President
Ronald Reagan signed COBRA into effect in 1986.86 At the time, the statute’s
health plan continuation coverage rules received relatively little attention.87
Generally, when COBRA applies,88 it requires an employer group health plan
to extend insurance coverage to an individual who would otherwise lose that
coverage,89 provided the individual elects such coverage90 and makes premium
payments91 in a timely manner. COBRA applies only to a “qualified benefici-
ary”92 who loses health insurance coverage under the employer’s plan due to a
“qualifying event.”93 A qualified beneficiary must make the COBRA election
within a specified period—at least sixty days—after he or she loses coverage
due to the qualifying event.94 Even then, COBRA continuation coverage is not
unlimited. For most individuals who elect COBRA for themselves and their
dependents following a termination of employment, COBRA provides a maxi-
mum of only eighteen months of continued coverage.95
As originally enacted, COBRA did not target retiree health plans although
then and now an astute older employee considering retirement could time his or
her termination of employment to take advantage of COBRA’s eighteen-month
83 See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Retired LTV Steelworkers Battle to Avert Loss of Health
Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1986, at A15.
84 See Steven Greenhouse, Health Plans Are Feeling a Little Peaked, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24,
1986, at E5.
85 See, e.g., Oversight on the LTV Corporation Filing for Bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of
the Federal Bankruptcy Code: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong.
1–2 (1986) (statement of Sen. Howard M. Metzenbaum).
86 See COBRA, supra note 18.
87 New York Times personal finance columnist Deborah Rankin, writing a month after
COBRA became law, characterized the continuation coverage rules as “[a] little-noticed pro-
vision of the new budget reconciliation act.” Deborah Rankin, Hanging on to Your Health
Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1986, at F11.
88 COBRA does not apply to an employer that “normally employ[s] fewer than 20 employ-
ees on a typical business day during the preceding calendar year.” 29 U.S.C. § 1161(b)
(2012).
89 Id. §§ 1161–67. For a useful layperson-oriented guide to COBRA, see U.S. DEP’T OF
LABOR, EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., AN EMPLOYEE’S GUIDE TO HEALTH BENEFITS UNDER
COBRA (2010), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/cobraemployee.pdf.
90 29 U.S.C. § 1165.
91 Id. § 1162(2)(C) (allowing a plan to terminate COBRA coverage if a covered individual
fails to make required premium payments in a timely manner); id. § 1162(3) (allowing a
plan to charge up to 102% of the full cost of the coverage).
92 A “qualified beneficiary” for COBRA purposes means both a “covered employee” who
loses coverage due to termination of employment (other than for gross misconduct) or reduc-
tion of hours and such a covered employee’s spouse and/or dependent children if they obtain
health coverage under the employer plan through the employee. Id. § 1167(3).
93 In most cases, the “qualifying event” that triggers COBRA obligations is loss of health
insurance coverage due to the covered employee’s termination of employment for whatever
reason (other than gross misconduct), but certain other situations—for example, a covered
employee’s death, divorce, or eligibility for Medicare—may also count as qualifying events
if they result in a qualified beneficiary’s loss of coverage under the employer plan. Id.
§ 1163.
94 Id. § 1165.
95 Id. § 1162(2)(A)(i).
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continuation coverage protection and use it to bridge to Medicare at age sixty-
five. Setting aside such planning, however, once a covered employee leaves
active employment and moves into an employer-sponsored retiree health plan,
nothing in COBRA requires an employer to maintain that retiree plan. In fact,
the original definition of a “qualifying event” that activates COBRA did not
include any termination or reduction of retiree benefits.96 Only after the LTV
bankruptcy filing and related retiree health benefit losses did Congress turn to
COBRA as a mechanism to protect retirees against a repeat of an LTV-type
debacle.
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 198697 (OBRA) retroactively
amended COBRA to extend its reach to retirees who lose benefits in connection
with their former employers seeking Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.98
OBRA added to the list of COBRA qualifying events a loss—or “substantial
elimination”—of coverage for a retiree (or covered spouse, widow, or depen-
dent)99 within one year before or after an employer’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy
filing.100 The protection applies only with regard to an employer “from whose
employment the covered employee retired” and only if that employer begins
bankruptcy proceedings on or after July 1, 1986,101 a date that easily covered
the LTV filing in mid-July 1986.
Congress continued its efforts with several measures intended to force
LTV (and any similarly situated plan sponsors) to maintain retiree health bene-
fits on a temporary basis.102 Within two years, still focused on the plight of
LTV retirees,103 Congress permanently strengthened protection for retirees of
bankrupt employers with the Retiree Benefits Bankruptcy Protection Act of
96 COBRA, supra note 18, 100 Stat. at 224–25.
97 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, 100 Stat. 1874 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.) [hereinafter OBRA].
98 As amended by OBRA, COBRA includes as a “qualifying event,” the occurrence of
which triggers the continuation coverage requirement, the loss of employment-based health
insurance—or “substantial elimination” in such coverage—as a result of Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy proceedings for an employer from whom the covered employee retired. 29 U.S.C.
§ 1163. A “qualified beneficiary” entitled to elect continuation coverage under such circum-
stances is defined to include a covered employee who had retired on or before the date of the
substantial elimination in coverage and such individual’s covered dependents. Id.
§ 1167(3)(C).
99 Id. § 1167(3)(C).
100 Id. § 1163.
101 Id.
102 See D. Ward Kallstrom, Employee Welfare Benefits in Bankruptcy, in 1 EMPLOYEE WEL-
FARE BENEFIT PLANS 523, 531–32 (Practising Law Inst. (PLI), Tax Law and Estate Planning
Series, No. 291, 1989) (explaining that the Continuing Appropriations Resolution, Pub. L.
No. 99-591, 100 Stat. 3341 (1986), as amended by Pub. L. No. 100-41, 101 Stat. 309 (1987)
and Pub. L. No. 100-99, 101 Stat. 716 (1987) required LTV—and any other company
already in or filing for bankruptcy protection after October 2, 1986—to maintain retiree
health benefits through October 15, 1987)).
103 See S. REP. NO. 100-119, at 1 (1987), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 683, 683–84
(“The LTV action prompted a congressional examination of how the Bankruptcy Code
affected the obligations of a reorganizing company to provide insurance benefits to its
retirees.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVJ\13-3\NVJ306.txt unknown Seq: 17 12-JUN-13 14:28
Spring 2013] THE SHIFTING FOCUS 775
1988 (RBBPA).104 The RBBPA focuses on “medical, surgical, or hospital care
benefits [payable] in the event of sickness, accident, disability, or death”105 for
retirees and their dependents, but only in the case of plans established or main-
tained by an organization prior to its filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protec-
tion.106 Although the RBBPA does not prohibit modification or termination of
retiree health benefits,107 it imposes a process for such changes that precludes
unilateral action by the employer.108 Among other requirements, the RBBPA
specifies that a proposal for changes must be submitted to
the authorized representative of the retirees, based on the most complete and reliable
information available at the time of such proposal, which provides for those neces-
sary modifications in the retiree benefits that are necessary to permit the reorganiza-
tion of the debtor and assures that all creditors, the debtor and all of the affected
parties are treated fairly and equitably.109
Only after such submission—and subsequent negotiation—may proposed
changes be filed with the bankruptcy court for approval.110
From the OBRA revisions to COBRA through the RBBPA, Congress was
clearly motivated by the fear of another LTV. Perhaps because of this, the
legislation is myopic in that it focuses only on the concerns of retirees whose
former employer files for bankruptcy. The concerns of other retirees are
ignored. It is possible, of course, that this narrow focus reflects the legislation
being a pure reaction to LTV. But other explanations also exist. First, in the
mid-to-late 1980s, when these statutes were enacted, employers had not yet
begun widespread termination or reduction of retiree health benefits.111 Indeed,
at the time of OBRA, many employers may not have fully appreciated the
expenses to come. Before the Financial Accounting Standards Board issued
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 106 (better known as FAS
106) in the early 1990s, employers were not required to compute the cost of
their future retiree health benefit commitments.112 Congress may reasonably
104 Retiree Benefits Bankruptcy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-334, 102 Stat. 610
(codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 1114) [hereinafter RBBPA].
105 11 U.S.C. § 1114(a) (2012).
106 Id.
107 By contrast, ERISA strictly limits the circumstances in which a defined benefit pension
plan may be terminated. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (providing the “exclusive means
of plan termination” for defined benefit pension plans). ERISA also prohibits reduction of
accrued retirement benefits. See id. § 1054(b)(1)(G).
108 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1114(f)(1).
109 Id.
110 Id. § 1114(g). At the time, at least some commentators interpreted the legislative history
as allowing courts to approve modification of retiree health benefits only if necessary to
avoid liquidation of the employer. See, e.g., Michael A. Lawson, Employee Benefits and
Reorganization Under Chapter 11: Is Shareholder Value Being Eroded?, in 18TH ANNUAL
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS INSTITUTE 165, 180 (PLI, Tax Law and Estate Planning Series, No.
280, 1988).
111 See supra note 13.
112 Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 106 (Employers’ Accounting for Pos-
tretirement Benefits Other Than Pensions) was issued in final form in December 1990, effec-
tive generally for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 1992. See FIN. ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 106, at 9 (1990),
available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas106.pdf. FAS 106 requires generally that post-retire-
ment benefit obligations, including welfare benefits such as health plan benefits, be recog-
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have perceived the problem as primarily one in the bankruptcy arena. In addi-
tion, unions retained a fair amount of political power in the mid-1980s.113
Given the degree to which the statutes of the late 1980s apply primarily to
unionized workers, they may reflect union influence.114
Whatever their instigation, the statutes may have indirectly prompted
undesirable employer actions.115 Thus, for example, one critic opined that “the
nized for accounting purposes at the time the obligation is accrued (i.e., when an employee
performs services) instead of on a pay-as-you-go basis. Id. at 5. When FAS 106 first took
effect, the impact on large corporations was stunning. By some estimates, the accrued costs
were expected to “end up totaling 4 or 5 times more than the number generated under a pay-
as-you-go system.” Craig Douglas Hampton, Retiree Health Benefits and COBRA Issues, in
PLANNING FOR AGING OR INCAPACITY 1994: LEGAL AND FINANCIAL ISSUES 525, 530 (PLI,
Tax Law and Estate Planning Series, No. D-231, 1994) (citing Health Insurance Options:
Health Insurance Costs of Large Corporations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. of the H.
Health, Ways and Means Comm., 102d Cong. (1991) (statement of Gregory J. McDonald,
Assoc. Dir. for Income Sec. Issues, Gen. Accounting Office)).
113 In 1983, 20.1% of the U.S. workforce—public and private sector—belonged to a union;
by 2010, only 11.9% of the overall workforce was unionized. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members—2010 (Jan. 21, 2011), available at
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/union2_01212011.pdf. Similarly, in 1985, 14.3%
of private sector workers were unionized as compared to only 6.9% in 2010. U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, supra note 35, at tbl.666. Given the decline in union membership in recent
decades, one might overlook the role of unions in today’s retiree health plan issues. See id.
Unions, however, were critical in the expansion of employment-based retiree health insur-
ance and remain a key stakeholder. See, e.g., G. Lawrence Atkins, The Employer Role in
Financing Health Care for Retirees, in 5 PROVIDING HEALTH CARE BENEFITS IN RETIRE-
MENT 100, 108 (Judith F. Mazo et al. eds., 1994) (observing that employment-based retiree
health insurance “was a benefit that emerged, largely without design or intent, through the
collective bargaining over benefits in the 1950s and 1960s” and that “[m]edical benefits
were often viewed by employers as a ‘throwaway’ in collective bargaining, because the cost
was such a small portion of total compensation”). Today, the presence of at least some
collectively bargained employees in a workforce increases the chance that the employer will
provide some type of retiree health plan. For example, in 2011, forty-four percent of large
employers offering retiree health benefits reported that their workforce was partially union-
ized. See Kaiser Family Found. & HRET, 2011 ANNUAL SURVEY, supra note 13, at 163.
114 It is worth noting in this context that the RBBPA model is clearly best suited for a
collectively bargained setting. The RBBPA forces an employer to disclose and negotiate
with retiree representatives before modifying or terminating retiree health benefits. See
supra notes 107–110 and accompanying text. For retirees whose benefits were negotiated
pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, the appropriate representative is naturally the
union (unless it declines). 11 U.S.C. § 1114(c). For non-unionized retirees, the statute autho-
rizes appointment of a “committee of retired employees” named by the bankruptcy trustee.
Id. § 1114(d). As a general matter, a union is far more likely to have the resources and
structure to be able to evaluate and negotiate an employer proposal than any stand-alone
committee of “retired employees.”
115 See, e.g., Shirley A. Coffey, Note, One Bankruptcy is Enough, 78,000 Is Too Many—
Protection of Retirement Benefits Under the Retiree Benefits Bankruptcy Protection Act of
1988, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 715, 716–17 (1992) (pointing to the unanticipated negative impact
of the RBBPA on benefit trusts established to fund retiree healthcare for mine and coal
workers). See also Leslie T. Gladstone, Retiree Benefits Bankruptcy Protection Act of 1988:
Welfare Benefits in Need of Reform, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 427, 427 (1991) (arguing that the
RBBPA not only “departs from nonbankruptcy law by disregarding the importance of con-
tractual enforcement” but also “departs from bankruptcy law in preferring one special inter-
est above all others, and thus it undermines the policies of reorganization”). A bankruptcy
court judge observed that “Section 1114 . . . ‘has spawned diverse and sometimes inconsis-
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impact of Section 1114 [the core RBBPA requirement] may be to cause credi-
tors to seek liquidation rather than reorganization,”116 a result that would
undercut the value to retirees, who lose altogether if their former employer
ceases operation.117 A number of court cases during the 1990s convinced most
practitioners that the RBBPA did not limit employers’ ability to terminate or
modify retiree health benefits as long as those employers had otherwise
reserved the right to make such unilateral terminations or modifications.118
This conclusion has come under review recently,119 but the fact remains that
the RBBPA seems to have had little effect in limiting retiree health plan reduc-
tions.120 Professor Daniel Keating thus displayed considerable prescience when
he observed, shortly after the RBBPA’s passage, that the statute “does little to
increase the likelihood that retirees will receive their promised health and life
insurance benefits.”121
tent interpretations and theories as to the substantive and procedural standards necessary for
modification of retiree benefits. Expressed colloquially, these interpretations are all over the
lot.’ ” Susan J. Stabile, Protecting Retiree Medical Benefits in Bankruptcy: The Scope of
Section 1114 of the Bankruptcy Code, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1911, 1913 (1993) (citing In re
Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 134 B.R. 515, 517 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991)).
116 Karen E. Wagner, Employee Benefit Claims in Bankruptcy, in EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LITI-
GATION 329, 353 (1993) (ALI-ABA CLE course materials—C793).
117 Some have attributed the growth in asset sales during the 1990s to employer efforts to
evade the restrictions of the RBBPA. See, e.g., Protecting Employees and Retirees in Busi-
ness Bankruptcies Act of 2007, 27 AM. BANKR. INST. J., July/Aug. 2008, at 10 (quoting
Babette Ceccotti’s testimony before the U.S. House Judiciary Subcommittee claiming that
“[d]ebtors are taking aim at retiree health costs notwithstanding § 1114, in many instances
by trying to evade the statutory requirements altogether. Asset sales in bankruptcy have
become pitched battles where buyers pick up distressed assets and leave employees and
benefits behind.”). See also Daniel Keating, Automobile Bankruptcies, Retiree Benefits, and
the Futility of Springing Priorities in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 96 IOWA L. REV. 261,
264 (2010) (arguing that the “asset-sale development is a natural consequence of the Bank-
ruptcy Code being weighed down by the significant springing-priority status of retiree medi-
cal benefits.”).
118 See, e.g., Susan P. Serota, ERISA Litigation Update, in PENSION, PROFIT-SHARING, AND
OTHER DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLANS 459, 468 (1992) (ALI-ABA CLE course materi-
als—C725) (citing a Second Circuit opinion, In re Chateaugay, 945 F.2d 1205 (2d Cir.
1991), where the court held that the RBBPA “applies only where the debtor has a contractual
obligation to provide retiree benefits,” and a bankruptcy court decision, In re Doskocil Cos.,
130 B.R. 870 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1991), finding that the RBBPA “did not bar the debtor from
unilaterally modifying the terms of its retiree health plan where the terms of the plan
expressly reserved to the company the right to modify, amend or terminate the plan”). See
also Ralph Brubaker, Postpetition Modification of At-Will Retiree Benefits in Chapter 11:
An Irreconcilable Clash of Legislative Policy Prerogative, 30 BANKR. L. LETTER, Dec.
2010, at 1 (noting that “[m]ost courts . . . have concluded that those provisions [the RBBPA
and related provisions] do not restrict a Chapter 11 debtor’s ability to freely modify or termi-
nate retiree benefit payments under a benefit plan that permits such modification or termina-
tion by its terms”).
119 In 2010, the Third Circuit issued a ruling that requires employers to follow the procedu-
ral process laid out in Section 1114 even with regard to benefits otherwise terminable at will
by employers. In re Visteon Corp., 612 F.3d 210 (2010) (discussed at length in Brubaker,
supra note 118, at 1–4).
120 See supra note 13.
121 Dan Keating, Good Intentions, Bad Economics: Retiree Insurance Benefits in Bank-
ruptcy, 43 VAND. L. REV. 161, 163 (1990) [hereinafter Keating, Good Intentions]. Professor
Keating continued to critique the RBBPA a few years later with the observation that “this
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On the other hand, another early commentator—looking at the OBRA
revisions of COBRA—called that legislation “a very modest, but nevertheless
potentially significant, legislative first step toward rectifying the incongruity
and injustice of leaving the continuance of retired workers’ health insurance
benefits to the unbridled discretion of the employer.”122 Early on, another
scholar saw potential in the RBBPA for “prevent[ing] a debtor from ever termi-
nating or modifying any retiree medical benefits during a Chapter 11 case other
than in accordance with the procedures set forth therein.”123
Overall, while the flaws and limitations of OBRA and the RBBPA are
clear, they nonetheless take an inherently protective stance toward affected plan
participants. And they do so by concentrating on rights for retirees. In the case
of OBRA, those are rights to elect COBRA continuation coverage, a protection
otherwise unavailable for those who lose benefits under a retiree medical
plan.124 In the case of the RBBPA, those rights come in the form of giving
retirees a voice in bankruptcy proceedings.125 While Congress surely could
have been more aggressive, these steps were better than nothing. They mark the
start of more than two decades of Congressional efforts to preserve retiree
health benefits on some level. At the time, they may also have been all that was
possible. In 1987, Reps. Ronnie Flippo and Rod Chandler introduced the
Retiree Health Protection Act of 1987 in the U.S. House of Representatives,
referencing the “LTV Corp.’s attempt to abandon its retiree health benefit obli-
gations” as “the first signs of the storm to come.”126 The proposed statute
would have encouraged pre-funding of retiree health benefits.127 It failed.128
legislative solution may amount to sound and fury signifying little.” Daniel Keating, Bank-
ruptcy Code § 1114: Congress’ Empty Response to the Retiree Plight, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J.
17, 18 (1993). Two decades later, he returned to the attack. See Keating, supra note 117, at
264–65 (characterizing the RBBPA as “a classic example of an ill-advised springing priority
which is not particularly effective” and pointing to the Chrysler and GM bankruptcy cases as
examples where “it was the nonbankruptcy leverage of the retirees rather than the bank-
ruptcy-specific priority of section 1114 that ended up giving the retirees medical benefits.
And what medical benefits the retirees did receive were still much less than what the two
auto companies originally promised them.”).
122 David L. Gregory, COBRA: Congress Provides Partial Protection Against Employer
Termination of Retiree Health Insurance, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 77, 80 (1987).
123 Stabile, supra note 115, at 1913–14.
124 See supra notes 97–101 and accompanying text.
125 See supra notes 103–10 and accompanying text.
126 133 CONG. REC. E2719 (daily ed. July 1, 1987) (statement of Rep. Ronnie G. Flippo).
127 See H.R. 2860, 100th Cong. (1987).
128 See id. The Internal Revenue Code (Code) makes pre-funding of retiree health benefits
difficult, if not impossible, for most non-unionized employers. See, e.g., David S. Dunkle,
VEBAs and Other Welfare Benefit Funding Arrangements, in PORTFOLIO NO. 395-3d, TAX
MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIOS, at § III (BNA 2013). Before the passage of the Deficit Reduc-
tion Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (DEFRA), employers could use a type of
tax-exempt trust known as a voluntary employees’ beneficiary association (VEBA) to accu-
mulate assets for future retiree health plan obligations. Contributions were deductible as
“ordinary and necessary” business expenses under Code Section 162. I.R.C. § 162(a) (1982).
Congress became concerned that a number of businesses had begun using VEBAs as inap-
propriate tax shelters. See, e.g., John H. Eggertsen & Michael J. Hainer, Recent Tax Act
Affects Employee Benefit Plans, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 21, 1985, at 15 (“[C]losely held and profes-
sional corporations often used group insurance contracts and VEBAs as investment vehicles
to defer compensation for highly compensated employees/shareholders.”). To curb the per-
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At least superficially, enacted legislation that favored retiree rights contin-
ued into the early 1990s. In 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Public
Employees Retirement System of Ohio v. Betts129 that the ADEA did not pro-
hibit plan provisions that extended disability income benefits only to employees
who terminated employment due to disability before age sixty.130 The ruling
overturned both District Court and Court of Appeals rulings against the Ohio
Public Employees Retirement System.131 Both lower courts had relied on an
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulatory interpretation
of the ADEA that, in relevant part, allowed “age-related reductions in
employee benefits” only if “justified by the increased cost of providing those
benefits to older employees.”132 The Supreme Court disagreed with the EEOC
and rejected the regulatory interpretation.133
Congress reacted a year later with the Older Workers Benefit Protection
Act of 1990 (OWBPA).134 The OWBPA expressly overturned the result in
Betts and clarified that the ADEA was intended “to prohibit discrimination
against older workers in all employee benefits except when age-based reduc-
tions in employee benefit plans are justified by significant cost considera-
tions.”135 The new statutory language in effect endorsed the regulatory position
the EEOC had maintained all along.
On the surface, the OWBPA seems overtly protective of retirees, in some
ways a natural extension of the Congressional approach in the 1980s. Practice,
however, diverged from this theory. Thanks to the presence of Medicare’s
ceived abuses, Congress included deduction limits in DEFRA that effectively eliminated the
practice for all but collectively bargained plans. See DEFRA § 511(a). As a result of
DEFRA, the Code provides that contributions to a “welfare benefit fund” (which includes a
VEBA) are deductible under Code Sections 419 and 419A, not under Code Section 162, and
then restricts deductions under 419 and 419A. I.R.C. §§ 419, 419A (2012). See also Treas.
Reg. § 1.162-10T, Q&A (2) (1992). Code Section 419A contains an exception for collec-
tively bargained plans. I.R.C. § 419A(f)(5); Treas. Reg. § 1.419A-2T (1986). Code Section
401(h) also allows for some accumulation of assets for retiree health benefits under a quali-
fied retirement plan, but only if such benefits are “subordinate to” retirement income bene-
fits. I.R.C. § 401(h). So-called 401(h) accounts are rarely used as a result of the restrictions.
See, e.g., Robert R. Trumble & Deborah A. Bigdely, Pensions, Health Care, and Workforce
Planning: The Baby Boom Impact, 20 J. COMPENSATION & BENEFITS, May/June 2004, at 15,
20 (observing that 401(h) account plans “are not used much and are more common in indus-
tries where workers tend to stay for long periods of time”). As late as 2006, only about a
quarter of larger employers offering retiree health benefits had pre-funded those obligations
in any way. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEWITT ASSOCS., supra note 55, at 12.
129 Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989).
130 Id. at 162. The plaintiff in Betts did not qualify for disability income benefits because
she was over age sixty; instead she received significantly less generous retirement income
benefits, leading to her lawsuit. Id. at 163.
131 Id. at 160; see Betts v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Mental Retardation, 631 F. Supp. 1198
(S.D. Ohio 1986); see also Betts v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Mental Retardation & Develop-
mental Disabilities, 802 F.2d 456 (6th Cir. 1986) (unpublished); see also Betts v. Hamilton
Cnty. Bd. of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities, 848 F.2d 692 (6th Cir.
1988).
132 Betts, 492 U.S. at 164, 170 (referencing 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10 (1988)).
133 Id. at 175.
134 Older Workers Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA), Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978
(1990) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–626 (2012)).
135 Id. § 101.
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safety net coverage for those age sixty-five and older, employers can reduce
retiree health expenses dramatically by the simple step of subordinating cover-
age to Medicare for eligible retirees.136 Thus, while an employer might main-
tain an early retiree on coverage identical to active employee health insurance,
that employer-sponsored insurance might drop to supplemental coverage (or
stop altogether) once the retiree attains Medicare eligibility.137 The individual
retiree is not necessarily adversely affected as long as the employer supplemen-
tal coverage, when added to Medicare’s own coverage, raises the level of insur-
ance in total to approximately the same as what an early retiree enjoys through
the employer alone. Because Medicare eligibility could be considered a proxy
for an age-based reduction in benefits, and because the employer is not spend-
ing the same amount for the older retiree compared to the younger one, the
OWBPA would seem to prohibit the practice. The legislative history of the
OWBPA,138 however, indicated that the new law was not intended to attack the
Medicare retiree health plan coordination structure that had become pervasive
among employers. As a result, notwithstanding the OWBPA, employers contin-
ued to coordinate with Medicare throughout the 1990s exactly as they had
before.139
What might one take away from the five years of Congressional efforts
from OBRA through the OWBPA? Given that employer retiree health plan
sponsorship plummeted from 66% in 1988 to 46% in 1991 and then down to
36% in 1993,140 federal intervention in the late 1980s and early 1990s proved
stunningly ineffective. Even if one ascribes altruistic participant-oriented pro-
tective goals to Congress and ignores other possible explanations for why legis-
lation was structured in certain ways, the degree of failure to protect retirees in
these years remains remarkable. It also makes whatever goals Congress may
have pursued somewhat irrelevant. Within a very few years, retiree health ben-
efits slid from a standard compensation component to more of a luxury offered
by a minority of employers.141 When one considers the flurry of federal activity
136 See supra notes 70–75 and accompanying text.
137 See, e.g., JAMES P. BAKER, JONES DAY, ERISA LITIGATION: THE LAW OF UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES 2–3 (2005), available at http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/9410bc
12-d6e6-4b34-8636-92f5044c096c/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/79e69d4a-4cb9-44
f6-9695-b2d86feb50ea/Law%20of%20Unintended.pdf (noting that, after the OWBPA,
“[o]ne thing seemed certain: Employer-provided retiree medical benefits would not be
affected because OWBPA’s legislative history indicated that the prior employer practices of
eliminating, reducing, or altering retiree medical benefits would remain lawful”).
138 See Erie Cnty. Retirees Ass’n v. Cnty. of Erie, 220 F.3d 193, 205–208 (3d Cir. 2000)
(discussing at length 136 CONG. REC. S13,597–S13,611 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1990)).
139 See Alan M. Sandals, Retiree Medical Benefits Litigation—Theories of Recovery and
Key Issues, in EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LITIGATION 193, 196 (2011) (ALI-ABA CLE course
materials—ST027). The Third Circuit’s Erie County decision in 2000, discussed below,
shook everyone’s understanding. See infra Part IV.C. For a critique of the OWBPA’s impact
on employer strategies in general, see Michael C. Harper, Age-Based Exit Incentives, Coer-
cion, and the Prospective Waiver of ADEA Rights: The Failure of the Older Workers Benefit
Protection Act, 79 VA. L. REV. 1271 (1993).
140 Kaiser Family Found. & HRET, 2011 ANNUAL SURVEY, supra note 13, at 161.
141 The dramatic decline in retiree health benefits in the early 1990s is usually attributed to
the looming implementation date for FAS 106, which became effective for most employers
at the end of 1992. See supra note 112.
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in the immediate aftermath of LTV’s bankruptcy filing and then reflects upon
the results, one might question why Congress bothered to do anything at all. At
the very least, this history should caution against hope of success with similar
participant-oriented legislation in the future.
B. Mandated Funding
A distinctly different approach to the problem of employment-based
retiree health insurance can be seen in two statutes separated by more than a
decade: the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992142 (Coal Act) and
the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act of 2006 (Postal Act).143 In
both cases, Congress took the unusual step of mandating funding of previously
promised retiree health benefits. The Coal Act created something akin to with-
drawal liability for multiemployer pension plans,144 but limited to multiem-
ployer welfare benefit trust funds intended to support health benefits for certain
retired coal miners and their dependents.145 Originally, companies engaged in
coal mining had negotiated funding obligations for these funds based on the
proportionate amount of coal mined.146 As time passed, many of the employers
ceased mining operations, vitiating any obligation to contribute to the funds for
retiree health benefits.147 Eventually, as the health benefit trusts neared insol-
vency, Congress passed the Coal Act in an effort to stabilize funding.148
Among the Coal Act’s restructuring rules were provisions that imposed ongo-
ing liability on entities—and their successors—that had previously employed
covered miners, without regard to whether those employers had long since left
the mining business.149 The Coal Act did not fare well despite its protective
goal. Various court challenges by affected companies ensued, with the U.S.
Supreme Court eventually ruling that certain key funding obligations under the
Coal Act constituted an unconstitutional taking.150
142 Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 19141, 106
Stat. 2776, 3036 (codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 9701–22).
143 Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act, Pub. L. No. 109-435, 120 Stat. 3198 (2006)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 39 U.S.C.).
144 For a detailed discussion of the complexities of multiemployer pension plan withdrawal
liability, see Multiemployer Plan Withdrawal Liability, in EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, supra
note 64, at 1235, 1235–1332.
145 See Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act § 19142(a)(2), 106 Stat. at 2776 (finding
that “in order to secure the stability of interstate commerce, it is necessary to modify the
current private health care benefit plan structure for retirees in the coal industry to identify
persons most responsible for plan liabilities in order to stabilize plan funding and allow for
the provision of health care benefits to such retirees”).
146 See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO), REP. NO. GAO-02-243, RETIRED
COAL MINERS’ HEALTH BENEFIT FUNDS: FINANCIAL CHALLENGES CONTINUE (2002) [herein-
after GAO, REP. NO. GAO-02-243] (providing background on the Coal Act and describing
the state of the funds in 2001). See also A Brief History of UMWA Health and Retirement
Funds, UNITED MINE WORKERS AM.(UMWA), http://www.umwa.org/?q=content/brief-his-
tory-umwa-health-and-retirement-funds-0 (last visited May 9, 2013).
147 GAO, REP. NO. GAO-02-243, supra note 146, at 1.
148 See id.; I.R.C. § 9702 (2012).
149 The Coal Act applied to what it calls a “signatory operator,” defined as a “person which
is or was a signatory to a coal wage agreement” as well as related entities and successors in
interest to such entities. I.R.C. § 9701(c).
150 E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 500 (1998).
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More than a decade later, the Postal Act focused on another struggling
business: the nation’s mail service. Hobbled with a changing marketplace and
expensive employee commitments, the USPS struggled for years, prompting
various reform attempts.151 The Postal Act was one of those attempts.152 The
legislation included a handful of provisions requiring pre-funding of the
USPS’s retiree health benefit liability through a Postal Service Retiree Health
Benefit Fund.153 In particular, the Postal Act imposed fixed payment require-
ments on the USPS for each year from 2007 through 2016, with annual
required payments ranging from $5.4 billion for 2007 up to $5.8 billion for
2016.154 The retiree health provisions came in response to revelations that the
USPS had been overfunding pension liabilities for its retirees and mounting
concern that the USPS’s historic pay-as-you-go approach to retiree health
expenses would prove inadequate to meet its future obligations.155
Mandated funding created its own problems. The USPS lost billions of
dollars in 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009.156 In 2009, after the Postmaster General
warned that the USPS could not pay the scheduled amount as due, Congress
reduced the required payment for that year to $1.4 billion from $5.4 billion.157
Financial problems did not abate.158 Although the USPS made the $5.5 billion
payment due for fiscal year 2010, it subsequently reported that it would “not be
able to make the required $5.5 billion prefunding payment for retiree health
benefits currently due by November 18, 2011, or the required $5.6 billion
prefunding payment for retiree health benefits that is due by September 30,
2012.”159 Congress extended the due date for the fiscal year 2011 $5.5 billion
three times in 2011 and eventually pushed the deadline out to August 1,
2012.160 In late July 2012, the USPS announced that not only would it not
151 See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. H6511–12 (2005) (Rep. Burton (Indiana) stating, with regard
to a predecessor to the Postal Act in 2005, that “[i]f we do not do something about postal
reform, what is going to happen is the costs are going to go through the roof, and instead of
this being an agency that deals with the expenses themselves, we are going to be seeing
taxpayers footing the bill for additional costs for postal service”).
152 For an overview of key provisions of the Postal Act and discussion of ongoing chal-
lenges, see KEVIN R. KOSAR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40983, THE POSTAL ACCOUNTABIL-
ITY AND ENHANCEMENT ACT: OVERVIEW AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (2009), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40983.pdf; see also Lauren T. Andrews, Note, Going Pos-
tal: What Can Reform Do for You?, 2 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 357 (2011).
153 5 U.S.C. § 8909a (2012).
154 Id. § 8909a(d)(3)(A).
155 See, e.g., KOSAR, supra note 152, at 1–2.
156 Id. at 7 (citing USPS, ANNUAL REPORT (Form 10-K) 12 (2009), available at http://about.
usps.com/who-we-are/financials/10k-reports/fy2009.pdf).
157 Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-68, § 164, 123 Stat. 2023
(2009).
158 See generally GAO, REP. NO. GAO-10-455, U.S. POSTAL SERVICE: STRATEGIES AND
OPTIONS TO FACILITATE PROGRESS TOWARD FINANCIAL VIABILITY (2010), available at http:/
/www.gao.gov/new.items/d10455.pdf.
159 USPS, ANNUAL REPORT (Form 10-K) 6 (2011), available at http://about.usps.com/who-
we-are/financials/10k-reports/fy2011.pdf.
160 Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-33, § 124, 125 Stat. 363, 366
(2011) (extending funding payment deadline to Oct. 4, 2011); Continuing Appropriations
Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-36, § 124, 125 Stat. 386 (2011) (extending funding payment
deadline to Nov. 18, 2011); Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012,
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make the 2011 payment by the August 2012 extension date, but that it also
would not be able to make the 2012 payment due in September 2012.161
Intense concern continues over the USPS’s long-term outlook and ability to
meet the payment obligations of the Postal Act’s retiree health fund.162
The mandated funding approach follows the path Congress chose for
defined benefit pension plans in ERISA almost four decades ago.163 In the case
of ERISA, of course, Congress strove to establish a system to avoid the devas-
tation of failed pension plans like that of Studebaker. In the early 1970s, no one
seems to have thought retiree health liabilities might need the same protec-
tions.164 Even if someone had thought such protection could be needed, the fear
of depressing voluntary employer sponsorship might have sufficed to squelch
any action. By the early 1990s, however, the risk for retiree health benefit com-
mitments was clear. Not only had LTV’s termination vividly demonstrated how
insecure retiree plans had become, but FAS 106 revealed the extent of retiree
health promises.165 In addition, the approach of empowering participants
through expanded rights had also proved less than successful.166 Trying a direct
funding mandate may thus have seemed a logical alternative approach. As
observed by Professor Keating in the context of the RBBPA:
Probably the greatest weakness of the new retiree benefits legislation is that it
fails to address the real problem behind crises like that in the LTV reorganization: the
failure to prefund the corporate promise to provide insurance benefits to retirees. If a
company has not set aside assets to cover its promise to retirees, a mere change in the
Bankruptcy Code cannot overcome that void.167
One might question why Congress limited its funding requirement to only
the coal mining trust fund in the early 1990s. The answer may be pure pragma-
tism. In the early 1990s, under FAS 106’s glaring disclosure light and the con-
comitant termination of almost half the retiree health plans in the country,
Congress would not have considered requiring all employers to fund future
retiree health plan liabilities. Financial ruin might have followed.168 Why just
Pub. L. No. 112-55, div. D, § 101, 125 Stat. 552, 710 (2011) (extending funding payment
deadline to Dec. 16, 2011); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, div.
C, tit. 6, § 632, 125 Stat. 786, 928 (2011) (extending funding payment deadline to Aug. 1,
2012).
161 Press Release, USPS, Postal Service Statement on Retiree Health Benefits Payment
(July 30, 2012), available at http://about.usps.com/news/national-releases/2012/pr12_0730
rhbpayment.htm.
162 See, e.g., KEVIN R. KOSAR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41021, THE U.S. POSTAL SER-
VICE’S FINANCIAL CONDITION: OVERVIEW AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 4–5 (2012), available
at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41024.pdf (noting that “the effects of the PAEA’s
mandatory payments to the Postal Service Health Benefits Fund on the USPS’s profitability
were considerable. . . . [I]f the USPS did not have to pay into this fund each year, it would
have experienced no operating losses until FY2009”).
163 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1081 (ERISA’s funding provisions, enacted in 1974).
164 Despite broad statements of intent, “ERISA in fact subjected welfare benefit plans to
virtually no substantive regulation other than the reporting and disclosure and fiduciary duty
rules.” Regulation of Welfare Plans Generally, in EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, supra note 64,
at 351, 355.
165 See FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., supra note 112, at 5.
166 See supra notes 124–25 and accompanying text.
167 See Keating, Good Intentions, supra note 121, at 163.
168 See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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the coal mining industry? As with earlier Congressional efforts, the answer may
be focused lobbying by affected unions.169 It may also be that the numbers of
affected coal mining retirees—and thus the overall obligation—were relatively
small.170 No matter the reason, the result was a comparable level of failure to
the participant-oriented protective efforts of the last half of the 1980s.171 On
some level, requiring proactive funding by the USPS may also reflect the uni-
queness of the situation—in the case of the USPS, a stand-alone quasi-public
institution—rather than any kind of endorsement of mandated funding as a via-
ble alternative for organizations generally.172
C. Employer Accommodation/Incentives
With the failures of both the participant-oriented protective rights
approach of the late 1980s and the mandated funding approach, Congress has
transitioned from a retiree-focused orientation to an employer-focused perspec-
tive. With the passage of the MMA173 at the end of 2003, Congress tried an
incentive—or carrot—approach. The MMA expands Medicare by offering pre-
scription drug coverage through private insurers under a new Part D.174 Con-
gress, however, also wanted to preserve existing employer-sponsored retiree
drug plans.175 To encourage employers, the MMA provides a direct subsidy to
employers who maintain retiree drug plans with coverage determined to be at
least actuarially equivalent to “standard prescription drug coverage” under Part
D.176 The subsidy equals twenty-eight percent of a covered individual’s “allow-
able retiree costs” for prescription drugs under the retiree plan—to the extent
169 See supra notes 113–14 and accompanying text.
170 By 1998, only 71,337 individuals were receiving benefits through the coal retiree health
trust funds. GAO, REP. NO. B-281186, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS: STATUS OF THE UMWA COM-
BINED BENEFIT FUND, at 5 (1998), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/HEHS-99-7R.
171 Id. at 6 (concluding that, even before the Supreme Court struck down part of the funding
mechanism in the Coal Act, “the Combined Fund is expected to be insolvent by 2000 and its
balance could continue to deteriorate thereafter”).
172 Interestingly, in hearings on the Coal Act in 1995, one speaker observed, “I am deeply
troubled by the thought that as other employers have difficulty in funding retiree health
benefits in the future, public policymakers might turn to the 1992 statute as a model.” Coal
Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Oversight
of the Comm. on Ways and Means, 104th Cong. 4 (1995) (statement of Nancy L. Johnson,
Chairperson, Subcomm. on Oversight), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
104hhrg36420/pdf/CHRG-104hhrg36420.pdf.
173 MMA, supra note 43.
174 For an excellent and detailed summary of the political process leading to the enactment
of the MMA, see Thomas R. Oliver, Philip R. Lee & Helene L. Lipton, A Political History of
Medicare and Prescription Drug Coverage, 82 MILBANK Q. 283, 318 (2004) (explaining
that the MMA’s retiree drug subsidy provisions “addressed one of the AARP’s principal
concerns and earlier estimates (2003) by the Congressional Budget Office that approxi-
mately one-quarter of Medicare beneficiaries with current employer-sponsored drug cover-
age would lose it once the benefit was enacted”).
175 Before the MMA created Part D, employment-based retiree health plans constituted the
single largest source of prescription drug coverage for retirees. See, e.g., KAISER FAMILY
FOUND., FACT SHEET: MEDICARE AND PRESCRIPTION DRUGS (2003) (“Employer-sponsored
plans, the leading source of drug coverage for seniors” in 2003).
176 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-132 (2012).
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those costs exceed a threshold and up to an annual maximum.177 The subsidy is
not taxable to the employer, and—until health reform passed in 2010—employ-
ers were allowed to disregard any subsidy payments in computing their deduc-
tion for retiree drug plan costs.178
Although some employers dropped retiree prescription drug coverage in
response to the enactment of Part D,179 the percentage of large employers
maintaining retiree health plans actually increased slightly in 2006 (when the
MMA took effect) from 2005—up to thirty-four percent from thirty-two per-
cent—before resuming its slow downward slip in 2007.180 It is impossible to
know whether Part D in fact convinced some employers to continue benefits
they might otherwise have reduced or terminated, but certainly no dramatic
declines occurred in 2006 as had happened in prior years. As a classification
matter, the MMA may be categorized as the first of a string of efforts to accom-
modate and directly incentivize desired employer action.
At virtually the same time that Congress established the MMA’s retiree
drug subsidy, the EEOC waded into retiree health plan issues with a proposed
regulation to clarify that employers could indeed “coordinate” retiree health
benefits with Medicare.181 The regulation was an administrative response182 to
a Third Circuit decision from 2000183 in which the court held that the ADEA
applies when “an employer offers its Medicare-eligible retirees health insur-
ance coverage allegedly inferior to the coverage offered to retired employees
not eligible for Medicare.”184 The case arose out of efforts by Erie County,
Pennsylvania, to manage its retiree health costs for former county employees
by differentiating between retirees who had reached age sixty-five and become
Medicare-eligible and early retirees who were not yet Medicare-eligible.185 The
county’s plan generally placed Medicare-eligible retirees in a less expensive
insurance option—one that the retirees viewed as less desirable.186 A group of
Medicare-eligible retirees argued that the county’s approach discriminated
against them on the basis of age, a violation of the ADEA unless an exception
177 Id. § 1395w-132(a)(3)(A). For 2012, the threshold was $320, and the maximum was
$6,500. See Cost Threshold and Cost Limit by Plan Year, CMS: RETIREE DRUG SUBSIDY
(Aug. 3, 2012), http://www.rds.cms.hhs.gov/reference_materials/threshold_limit.htm.
178 See I.R.C. § 139A (2012).
179 KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEWITT ASSOCS., supra note 55, at 24 (finding that eight
percent of surveyed large employers dropped retiree drug coverage in 2006).
180 Kaiser Family Found. & HRET, 2011 ANNUAL SURVEY, supra note 13, at 161 (reporting
32% of large employers sponsoring some form of retiree health benefits in 2007, 29% in
2008, 28% in 2009, and 26% in both 2010 and 2011).
181 See ADEA; Retiree Health Benefits, 68 Fed. Reg. 41,542, 41,542–47 (proposed July 14,
2003) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 1625, 1627).
182 See Press Release, EEOC, EEOC Moves to Protect Retiree Health Benefits (Dec. 26,
2007), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/12-26-07.cfm (stating that
the “EEOC proposed the rule in response to a controversial decision in 2000 by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Erie County Retirees Association v. County of
Erie” and quoting then-EEOC Vice Chair Leslie E. Silverman as saying, “The Erie County
decision would have made most existing retiree health plans unlawful. EEOC’s new rule will
ensure that employers can continue to offer their retirees much needed health benefits.”).
183 Erie Cnty. Retirees Ass’n v. Cnty. of Erie, 220 F.3d 193 (3d Cir. 2000).
184 Id. at 196.
185 Id. at 196–97.
186 Id. at 197.
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applies. The Third Circuit agreed and remanded the case to the District Court to
determine if the county’s practice satisfied an ADEA safe harbor that an
employer “either must provide equal benefits to older and younger workers, or
must incur the same costs on behalf of older and younger workers.”187
The Erie County decision alarmed a range of stakeholders188 because
employers had consistently relied on the common understanding of the
OWBPA’s legislative history as permitting the coordination practice.189
Employer outcry then prompted the EEOC in August 2001 to announce that it
had “begun a review of its policy concerning the application of the [ADEA] to
employer-sponsored retiree health benefit plans.”190 In the process, the EEOC
also rescinded its prior policy that “retiree health plans that are reduced or
eliminated on the basis of age or Medicare-eligibility violate the ADEA.”191
The review concluded with issuance of the proposed regulation in the summer
of 2003.
The EEOC took the position from the beginning that its goal was to
develop “a new policy, consistent with the ADEA, that does not discourage
employers from providing this valuable benefit.”192 The proposed regulation
focused on the decline in retiree health benefits generally and the risk that
employers would eliminate or reduce benefits for early retirees, rather than
increasing benefits for Medicare-eligible retirees, if the ADEA were interpreted
to require equal cost/equal benefit between the two groups.193 Indeed, the
EEOC noted, in the aftermath of the Erie County litigation, the Erie County
early retirees ended up with a less generous health insurance plan while Medi-
care-eligible retirees remained at the same level because the county equalized
the two groups by reducing the package for early retirees.194 Rather than
accepting this result, the EEOC proposed a new regulatory safe harbor to the
ADEA that “permits the practice of coordinating employer-provided retiree
health coverage with eligibility for Medicare or a State-sponsored retiree health
187 Id. at 199 (referencing 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10 (1989)); see also id. at 217 (holding “(1)
that appellants have established a claim under 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) because they have been
treated differently in their ‘compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of . . . age’ and (2) that the safe harbor provided under 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(B)(i) is
applicable if the County can meet the equal benefit or equal cost standard”).
188 See, e.g., Access to Adequate Health Insurance: How Does the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission’s Recent Rule Affect Retiree Health Benefits: Hearing Before the S.
Special Comm. on Aging, 108th Cong. 8 (2004) (statement of Leslie E. Silverman, EEOC
Comm’r), available at http://aging.senate.gov/publications/5172004.pdf. Upon remand, the
District Court found in favor of the retirees, holding that the County’s benefit program did
not satisfy the ADEA safe harbor. Erie Cnty. Retirees Ass’n v. Cnty. of Erie, 140 F. Supp.
2d 466, 477 (2001). At approximately the same time, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certio-
rari with respect to the Third Circuit decision. Erie Cnty. v. Erie Cnty. Retirees Ass’n, 532
U.S. 913 (2001).
189 See supra notes 138–39 and accompanying text.
190 Press Release, EEOC, EEOC Rescinds Guidance; Will Review Policy on Retiree Health
Plans (Aug. 20, 2001), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/archive/8-
20-01.html.
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 See ADEA; Retiree Health Benefits, 68 Fed. Reg. 41,542 (proposed July 14, 2003) (to
be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 1625, 1627).
194 Id. at 41,546.
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benefits program.”195 Despite a legal challenge from the AARP,196 the EEOC
regulation became final in the winter of 2007, providing employers with secur-
ity that they could terminate plans, or otherwise coordinate benefits with Medi-
care, for Medicare-eligible retirees while preserving more generous benefits for
early retirees who were not yet Medicare-eligible.197
The most recent federal efforts involving employment-based retiree health
plans form small parts of the monumental health reform legislation from
2010.198 I have argued elsewhere that, while health reform overall may eventu-
ally turn out to be a positive development for retirees, the cumulative effect on
the continuation of employer-sponsored retiree health plans is likely nega-
tive.199 For purposes of this Article, three provisions of PPACA deserve further
discussion: the Early Retiree Reinsurance Program (ERRP), a change in tax
treatment for the MMA’s retiree drug plan subsidies, and an absence of any
ongoing mandate for employers to maintain health insurance for retirees.
The ERRP picked up the essence of an idea from the old Clinton Health
Savings Act to let the federal government act as a reinsurer for employer-spon-
sored health plans for early retirees (i.e., those at least age fifty-five but not yet
Medicare-eligible).200 The ERRP, however, was comparatively limited in
scope. Funded with only $5 billion and scheduled to end no later than January
195 Id. at 41,547.
196 AARP v. EEOC, 383 F. Supp. 2d 705 (E.D. Pa. 2005). The AARP initially won its
challenge to the regulation, convincing a district court to issue an injunction against the rule.
Id. at 712. Subsequently, however, the district court reversed its position based on different
grounds. AARP v. EEOC, 390 F. Supp. 2d 437, 441 (E.D. Pa. 2005). The second district
court ruling was upheld on appeal by the Third Circuit. AARP v. EEOC, 489 F.3d 558, 561
(3d Cir. 2007). The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari on AARP’s appeal of the Third
Circuit decision. AARP v. EEOC, 552 U.S. 1279 (2008).
197 ADEA; Retiree Health Benefits, 72 Fed. Reg. 72,938, 72,938–43 (2007).
198 See The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 119 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 25, 26, 29, 42 U.S.C.).
199 See generally Susan E. Cancelosi, The Bell Is Tolling: Retiree Health Benefits Post-
Health Reform, 19 ELDER L.J. 49 (2011).
200 The Clinton Administration’s proposed health plan contained a provision that would
have shifted early retirees age fifty-five to sixty-four to so-called “regional alliances” and
required their former employers to pay twenty percent of the premium cost of the coverage if
the employers had previously been sponsoring a retiree health plan for the affected individu-
als. See Health Security Act, H.R. 3600, 103d Cong. §§ 1004, 6112, 6114, 6121 (1993). The
federal government would have covered the remaining eighty percent of the premium cost,
effectively subsidizing an enormous percentage of retiree health insurance costs previously
shouldered by employers. The General Accounting Office estimated that the arrangement
would reduce employers’ accrued retiree health benefit liability by $188 billion over a three-
year period. GAO, REP. NO. B-257695, EARLY RETIREE HEALTH: HEALTH SECURITY ACT
WOULD SHIFT BILLIONS IN COSTS TO FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 3 (1994), available at http://
www.gao.gov/assets/90/89756.pdf. The subsidy evaporated with the Clinton plan itself, and
the Clinton administration settled for a more incremental legislative approach to health insur-
ance and related issues. See David Cutler & Jonathan Gruber, Health Policy in the Clinton
Era: Once Bitten, Twice Shy 2–3 (Harvard Ctr. for Bus. and Gov’t, June 27–30, 2001)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/Conferences/
economic_policy/CUTLER-GRUBER.pdf. Thus, for example, near the end of the decade,
the administration floated an extension of COBRA for early retirees who lost coverage for
any reason as well as an opening of Medicare to buy-in by involuntary early retirees age
fifty-five and older and all those age sixty-two to sixty-four. See RICHARD W. JOHNSON,
MARILYN MOON & AMY J. DAVIDOFF, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., A MEDICARE BUY-IN FOR
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1, 2014,201 the ERRP reimbursed employers for eighty percent of costs for an
individual plan participant once that person incurred at least $15,000 in medical
expenses, with a maximum of $90,000 in expenses taken into account.202 The
ERRP thus would pay potentially up to $60,000 in subsidies per individual per
year. The PPACA included virtually no restrictions on which employers could
qualify for the ERRP subsidies as long as an employer offered health insurance
for early retirees, and large numbers of government employers applied for and
received the subsidies.203 The ERRP’s success turned out to be its downfall. By
May 6, 2011, CMS, which administers the ERRP, had stopped accepting new
applications for reimbursement under the program.204 By December 9, 2011,
CMS reported that $4.5 billion in ERRP funds had been paid out for claims and
announced that no reimbursement would be made for claims incurred after
December 31, 2011.205 The ERRP thus lasted less than two years and ended for
all practical purposes two full years before its scheduled sunset.
Meanwhile, the other primary provision of the PPACA that directly targets
employment-based retiree health benefit takes effect in 2013. Effective for tax
years beginning after 2012, health reform ends the double dipping created by
the MMA to allow employers to calculate their deduction for retiree drug costs
without backing out the value of the federal government subsidy.206 Eliminat-
ing that tax benefit translates to higher taxes for affected employers, making
employer-sponsored drug plans for retirees noticeably more expensive.
Accounting rules required many large employers to report the impact of the tax
change by the end of the first quarter of 2010 when health reform was
enacted.207 Employers reported dramatic numbers almost immediately—for
example, AT&T took a $1 billion charge against earnings, and Verizon
reported a $970 million charge.208
Finally, one last PPACA provision deserves notice—largely because of its
absence. While the PPACA creates incentives and penalties to push employers
THE NEAR-ELDERLY: DESIGN ISSUES AND POTENTIAL EFFECTS ON COVERAGE i, 2 (2002)
(providing analysis of different Medicare buy-in proposals).
201 42 U.S.C. § 18002(a)(1) (2012); see also Early Retiree Reinsurance Program, 75 Fed.
Reg. 22,450 (May 5, 2010) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 149).
202 42 U.S.C. § 18002(c) (adjusting the $15,000 base and $90,000 cap “each fiscal year
based on the percentage increase in the Medical Care Component of the Consumer Price
Index for all urban consumers (rounded to the nearest multiple of $1,000) for the year
involved”).
203 See, e.g., CMS, EARLY RETIREE REINSURANCE PROGRAM: REIMBURSEMENT UPDATE
(June 17, 2011), available at http://cciio.cms.gov/resources/files/errp_reimbursement_
update_06172011.pdf.
204 Early Retiree Reinsurance Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 18,766 (Apr. 5, 2011).
205 CMS, EARLY RETIREE REINSURANCE PROGRAM: REIMBURSEMENT UPDATE 1 (Dec. 9,
2011) [hereinafter CMS, REIMBURSEMENT UPDATE (Dec. 2011)], available at http://cciio.
cms.gov/resources/files/Files2/12092011/errp_disbursement_12_02_2011_508.pdf.
206 See I.R.C. § 139A(a) (2012), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act
of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1407, 124 Stat. 1029 (amending I.R.C. § 139A). See also
supra note 178 and accompanying text.
207 See FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., supra note 112, at 5–6, 12.
208 Amy Thomson & Olga Kharif, Verizon Joins AT&T, Caterpillar in Booking Expenses
from Health-Care Law, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 1, 2010, 10:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2010-04-02/verizon-joins-at-t-in-booking-health-care-costs.html.
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to maintain a minimal level of health insurance for their employees,209 it does
nothing whatever to encourage comparable behavior with regard to retirees.
The ERRP was always scheduled to end in 2013 at the latest.210 At the same
time, however, a host of new regulations directed at insurers and the implemen-
tation of a new controlled marketplace for individual insurance purchases sug-
gest that retirees should have more opportunity beginning in 2014 to purchase
individual coverage than has historically been available. Congress’s implicit
assumption in health reform appears to have been that retiree plans need stabili-
zation only until the new world of individual coverage options come online.
Thus, the employer penalty provisions of PPACA target only active employee
plans,211 leaving retiree plans completely to the discretion of employers.
After the participant-oriented focus of the late 1980s and the mandated
funding experiments of the Coal Act and the Postal Act, evaluating the latest
category of federal intervention is difficult. The participant-focused efforts
failed to protect retirees against plan terminations in the late 1980s and early
1990s;212 mandated funding spawned other problems.213 How successful the
incentive/accommodation approach will be in the long run is hard to know. In
the years immediately after introduction of Part D and the retiree drug plan
subsidy, the percentage of larger employers offering retiree medical insurance
indeed bumped up ever so slightly (in 2006 from 2005), but then settled back
down to the slow downward slippage pattern that has existed since the early
1990s.214 The increase in 2006 may well have reflected a temporary boost from
the retiree drug subsidy, but no similar incline appeared for 2010 and 2011
even though ERRP funds were being disbursed in those years. It is, of course,
possible that the number of retiree health plans would have plunged in recent
years without the incentives, but that is merely supposition.
The downside of the incentive approach lies in its cost. Propping up
employer plans with subsidies may work because the government assumes
much of the financial burden, but paying employers to continue benefits creates
at best a limited stopgap. The “success” of the ERRP provides an excellent
example.215 All types of retiree health plan sponsors across the country, from
209 I.R.C. § 4980H(a).
210 42 U.S.C. § 18002(a)(1).
211 See I.R.C. § 4980H(a).
212 See supra notes 138–39 and accompanying text.
213 See supra notes 148, 154–62 and accompanying text.
214 See Kaiser Family Found. & HRET, 2011 ANNUAL SURVEY, supra note 13, at 161.
From 36% in 1993, the number of large employers sponsoring some type of retiree health
plan rose to 40% in 1995, 1998, and 1999, before dropping back down to 34% in 2000.
Through 2007 the percentage hovered in the low to mid-thirty percentiles until it slipped
down to 29% in 2008 and has declined slowly since then. Id.
215 A similar example can be seen with COBRA. Congress did not expand COBRA to
require employers to extend COBRA to retirees in the event of benefit reduction or termina-
tion outside of bankruptcy, most likely in recognition of the cost. When Congress passed the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, the federal government granted a tax
credit for a limited time equal to sixty-five percent of employers’ premium cost for eligible
individuals in an effort to make continuation coverage more widely accessible. American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 3001, 123 Stat. 115; see also
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FACT SHEET: COBRA PREMIUM REDUCTION (2010), available at
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/fsCOBRApremiumreduction.pdf. One study estimated that
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governments to unions to private employers,216 applied as quickly as possible
for funds. But $5 billion in funding, intended to bridge to 2014, covered barely
more than a year and a half of expenses.217 What will happen now? Was the
cost reprieve adequate to permit plans to survive until 2014, or will plans start
falling away over the next two years, leaving early retirees without coverage
before 2014 and arrival of the PPACA health insurance exchanges? Any time
the government starts paying directly to prompt desired behavior, that financial
support creates an artificial sense of stability. In the case of the ERRP, Con-
gressional efforts to allocate additional funds failed in the midst of 2011’s sum-
mer budget crisis.218 Sooner or later, the MMA retiree drug subsidy—currently
without an end date or a financial cap—may taper off also if the economy does
not improve. Without government money, programs that employers can no
longer afford—which may well include almost all retiree health plans—are
likely to end.219
The complete absence of long-term incentives in the PPACA to encourage
employer maintenance of retiree health plans underscores the lack of collective
concern over this benefit’s survival. At best, the MMA and the ERRP try to
shore up existing plans, but even then not forever. The EEOC has jumped to the
employer side to accommodate existing practice rather than nudging it in a
different direction. It is as though Congress has acceded to the belief that retiree
health benefits cannot be saved for the future. As long as the federal govern-
ment directly offers money, employers will accept it, and this might prolong
life for a while. But that seems to be all anyone at the federal level is willing to
do. Could this reflect the decline of union influence, a key historic defender of
retiree health plans? Maybe. Could it reflect a more business-oriented shift
overall at the federal level over the past two decades? Maybe. Could it reflect a
tacit acquiescence to a reality that many have recognized, willing or not?
Maybe. As compared to the approaches of the past, could employer accommo-
dation be construed as more successful? That likely depends on how one mea-
sures success.
between a quarter and a third of subsidy-eligible workers utilized the COBRA subsidy for
continuing health insurance. U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, COBRA INSURANCE COVERAGE SINCE
THE RECOVERY ACT: RESULTS FROM NEW SURVEY DATA 1, http://www.treasury.gov/
resource-center/economic-policy/Documents/cobra%20final%20report.pdf (last visited May
9, 2013). The cost to the federal government was $3.7 billion. Tax Benefit Programs,
RECOVERY.GOV, http://www.recovery.gov/Transparency/fundingoverview/Pages/taxbenefits-
details.aspx#COBRA (last visited May 9, 2013).
216 See, e.g., CMS, REIMBURSEMENT UPDATE (Dec. 2011), supra note 205.
217 See supra notes 204–05 and accompanying text.
218 Retiree Health Coverage Protection Act, S. 1088, 112th Cong. 2 (2011), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112s1088is/pdf/BILLS-112s1088is.pdf (representing
a failed effort to allocate an additional $5 billion in funds to the ERRP).
219 One risk with employment-based health insurance is that plans can continue to exist in
name, but shift costs increasingly to participants through higher premiums, deductibles and
co-payments. Eventually, such cost-shifting can largely undercut the value of the plan to the
participants. See supra note 55.
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V. CONCLUSION
In light of the vulnerability of retirees, federal intervention to ensure
access to health insurance has been understandable, but hardly successful.
Returning for a moment to the retirees themselves, it is worth remembering that
different groups of retirees have differing levels of vulnerability with regard to
employer-sponsored health insurance. The choices made by the EEOC with its
ADEA regulation and by health reform with its ERRP subsidy reflect an
implicit acknowledgement that all retirees are not equally in need. In both situ-
ations, the government chose to protect and support early retirees over Medi-
care-eligible ones. In a world of limited resources, this allocation of resources
makes logical sense. After all, Medicare-eligible beneficiaries—unlike early
retirees without employer-based coverage—already have some reasonable level
of acceptable health insurance. Similarly, the decisions in the PPACA to reduce
the value of the retiree drug plan subsidy (through elimination of the tax bene-
fit) and to end the ERRP when individual insurance becomes available reflect a
balancing determination. As long as individuals have access to some degree of
health insurance, as a nation we seem comfortable that we have met our obliga-
tions. Whether those individuals can afford that health insurance, or the out-of-
pocket costs the insurance does not cover, apparently troubles us less. The par-
ticipant-oriented concerns of a few decades ago have ceded to a deferential,
supportive focus on employer challenges and desires. That shift cannot be posi-
tive for retirees, but its full ramifications will take a few more years to be felt.
